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Abstract 
This thesis begins by examining the natural-historical character of Theodor Adorno’s thought 
and corpus, 1931–1969, by way of engaging the centennial of the October Russian Revolution. 
In the first three chapters we attempt to read Adorno’s corpus as écriture or writing whereupon 
unconscious writing of history is transcribed. This literary-driven approach to Adorno’s work 
highlights the primacy of history for his thought, whence his late-Marxism issues that culminates 
in what we call a politics of experience. Given the historical experience we seek to make legible 
heretofore, in chapter four we briefly turn to the hyper-object of ongoing and future 
anthropogenic global warming and ask how to narrativize the entangled trajectory of 
environmental politics and countenance its outcome in light of the broader history of the Left 
stemming from the early 20th century and leading to the present. Throughout we will attend to 
themes including the inheritance of the ruin of German Idealism as well as the failures of 
Marxism and the Left; the historical compulsion of a post-Hegelian negative dialectics and its 
relation to a metacritical engagement with Freudian psychoanalysis; the quandary of late-
Marxism’s cul-de-sac and broad turn to aesthetics; the interdisciplinary humanities as a form of 
critical object-dependence; the constitutive non-identities of history, experience and criticism; 
the citational disclosure of history and its relation to pedagogy and the demos; a poetics of 
natural history; and finally, the non-identical claims praxis makes upon theory. 
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  1 
Preface 
 
Fittingly belated from the outset, the topical occasions and impetuses for the composition 
of this thesis have now receded from the present moment. This thesis was originally written 
between September 2016–May 2017 in the form of three discrete but interrelated long-form 
essays; however, due to new program length requirements only the first two studies are presented 
here, with the first essay subdivided into three parts and the second essay condensed. The 
original third essay—a metacritical application of Theodor Adorno’s philosophical aesthetics on 
what I have termed contemporary post-Sandy literature, which was written partly on the occasion 
of the 2017 Communal Presence: New Narrative Writing Today conference at UC Berkeley and 
delivered there on the topical publication of Andrew Durbin’s novel MacArthur Park (2017)—
has been omitted altogether. This final study was intended to finally address the present by 
crystallizing the two preceding historico-philosophical essays, and to thereby offer resolution to 
the foregoing nonsynchronicity.  
Some parts of chapters 1–3 were written and rewritten for the 2017 Legacy of the Russian 
Revolution conference held at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia. In this conference paper I 
make the overarching case that Adorno is to the Russian Revolution what Hegel is to the French 
Revolution, the latter as per Rebecca Comay’s Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French 
Revolution (2010). I attempt to capture in this conference paper how Adorno’s corpus may itself 
be regarded as a ‘dialectical image’ forged out of the aftermath of 1917. 
 
Introduction 
Many of the seed-germs of this thesis were born while studying Adorno’s posthumously 
published lectures on Kant and the ‘problems of moral philosophy’ from the 1960s with Susan 
  2 
Buck-Morss at the CUNY Graduate Center in February 2015. However, this thesis formally 
began as an investigation into the idea of ‘natural history’ in the works of Walter Benjamin, 
Theodor Adorno, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, a thesis topic originally recommended to 
me by Tilottama Rajan. Along the way, more concerns and matters migrated into this already 
capacious research topic.  
A central underlying impulse of this thesis, one that is perhaps contrarian at first blush, is 
to highlight and bring into the fold what might otherwise pass as a blindspot when one operates 
within this specific context. Here my concern is not with ‘praxis’ (i.e., practice informed by 
critical (non-identical) thinking) as such, but more specifically, with what Adorno in the above 
lectures calls the “great inroads into theory” “made” by “praxis.”1 “Praxis” here used, in the 
context of the lecture, in reference to what Adorno calls “the celebrated unity of theory and 
praxis implied by Marxian theory and then developed above all by Lenin.”2 As we will soon 
explore, however, Adorno will want to cleave this “unity” and stress the non-identity of theory 
and praxis. As indicated above, in this thesis ‘critical’ will often be equated with ‘non-identical,’ 
which is intended to mirror the (historical) dialectics at a standstill or antinomies that give rise to 
the emergence and apparent necessity of Critical Theory. 
Despite the thematic primacy accorded to praxis in this thesis, the idea of natural history 
nevertheless serves as a more instructive organizing-principle for grouping the two essays 
presented here. With regard to Adorno’s work specifically, which will occupy us chiefly 
throughout the thesis, natural history is primarily employed by him as a critical idea, a certain 
                                                   
1 Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 4. In a different lecture and context, Adorno will profess, “I believe one 
must extrapolate theory from the most advanced tendencies of development, not vice versa” (Adorno, Aesthetics, 
84). 
2 Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, 4.  
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“dialectical way of seeing.”3 By contrast, Benjamin’s usage of the idea, for instance, is much 
more complex and variable, as has been studied at length by Beatrice Hanssen in Benjamin’s 
Other History (2000).  
In its broadest sweep, the idea of natural history is something of a dialectical image for 
Adorno’s philosophy of history and, as I will venture, his entire thought proper. Against a 
progressivist view of history of self-overcoming and transformation, Adorno’s corpus captures 
both explictly and negatively how decay and disintegration preponderantly inform processes of 
history and thought (e.g., intellectual history) itself. Such a view of history, I will argue, emerges 
not only out of Adorno’s critical engagements with Benjamin and his metacritiques of Kant, 
Hegel, et al.—and much less stems from an imputed ‘negative pathos’ or otherwise—but was 
informed, first and foremost, by his own lived, historical and critical experience, 1903–1969. In 
my first three chapters I attempt to trace how such lived experience—both peripheral and 
immediate—informed Adorno’s thought.  
If there is a central motif or thought-figure running throughout Adorno’s work it is the 
breakdown of dialectics into unsublatable antinomies. This motif will be explicated most 
forcefully in and through what we will call Adorno’s late-Marxism, whose chief cipher is the 
antinomy that obtains between theory and praxis in his work. This antinomy, I will argue, 
ultimately culminates in what we call a politics of experience that is operative and implicit in his 
corpus.  
As I seek to demonstrate in chapters 1–3, the encroachment of history upon Adorno’s 
thought causes his thought and corpus to become themselves natural-historical: bearing the 
marks of stasis and decay. Framing my engagement with Adorno through the lens of the 
centennial of the October Russian Revolution will prove to heighten these dimensions of his 
                                                   
3 Pensky, “Three Kinds of Ruin,” 66. 
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work. If Adorno’s oeuvre is natural-historical, then history may be understood to constitute its 
proper Ur-text—an archi-writing that is made legible through his own object-dependence to 
history. Adorno’s corpus can thus be regarded as a coded text whereupon unconscious writing is 
transcribed that opens onto that which exceeds it. Finally, my historical and literary-driven 
reading of Adorno will prove to be speculative insofar as it addresses the whole of his corpus so 
as to explore how history informs it.  
In his essay “The Climate of History: Four Theses” (2010), Dipesh Chakrabarty argues 
that “the crisis of climate change calls on academics to rise above their disciplinary prejudices, 
for it is a crisis of many dimensions.”4 In the space that remains for a final chapter, our 
heretofore broad engagements with Adorno and Benjamin’s methodologies and interdisciplinary 
models of criticism assist us in reckoning with—and even perhaps speculatively redressing—the 
hyper-object of anthropogenic global warming through a prism of empirical-hermeneutical and 
critical-speculative lenses. Chapter four, a critical reading of Melathopoulos and Stoner’s 2015 
Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century Helplessness in the Face of Climate Change, 
attempts to allegorically constellate two historico-political trajectories, the history of the Left and 
environmental politics. In the interest of wordcount limits, the essay is composed of a series of 
thematic notes and places stylistic emphasis on historiographic citation.  
Within this chapter we understand the broader history of the Left as constituting the 
proper ‘prehistory’ of environmental politics, whence recognizable eco-politics and -movements 
are grasped as emerging alongside and out of the New Left between the 1960s–80s in North 
America and Europe. More generally, the essay queries how to narrativize the trajectory of eco-
politics and address its outcome, concerns which emerge from a more fundamental and pressing 
question, I argue, of how to countenance contemporary environmental politics in light of the 
                                                   
4 Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History,” 215. 
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encompassing history of the Left stemming from the early twentieth century and leading to the 
present: from the traditional (1848–1910s) to the post-political (‘80s–contemporary) Left—a 
trajectory we sketch in the first three chapters. From here, we seek to address the unsublatable 
extremes and antinomies that animate contemporary eco-politics (on the levels of both theory 
and praxis) in constellation with deeper historico-philosophical problematics that originate out 
of, and tragically plague, the so-called history of the Left.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  6 
1. Looking Back on Adorno’s Late-Marxism  
      (On the Centennial of the Russian Revolution) 
 
 
The delayed thinking of praxis always has  
something inappropriate about it, even when  
it puts it off out of naked compulsion.  
                                                      —Adorno5 
 
 
 
 
 
I. ‘1917’—100 Years On? (A Ruse) 
Lenin—“Who, him? / His name is so strange. From the eagle it draws imperial or 
historic power”; Lenin, whose very name has become synonymous and even conflated with the 
portentous year of 1917—taking on a life of its own as ‘1917’; Lenin wrote in 1920 of the 
October Russian Revolution’s “international significance” as lying in the “inevitability of a 
repetition, on an international scale, of what we in Russian have gone through,” a repetition that 
the fortuitous centennial of 1917 occasions us here to raise and hold open, as Lenin does in 1920:  
understanding international significance [of the Russian Revolution] to mean the 
international validity or the historical inevitability of a repetition on an international scale 
of what has taken place in our country, it must be admitted that certain fundamental 
features of our revolution do possess such a significance.6 
 
The closure of the tendential world-shaping revolutionary praxis that issued from the 
October Russian Revolution of 1917, caused not the least by a preponderance of geopolitical 
                                                   
5 Adorno, ND, 244. 
6 Derrida, Glas, 1; my emphasis; Lenin, LWC, 7. See Lenin’s invocation of Ivan Krylov’s fable Eagle and the Hens 
in “Notes of a Publicist.” 
  7 
counter-revolutionary social force, occasioned Lenin’s—and, as we will see, many others’ who 
shared his orientation—turn from concrete politics to a broader, more diffuse politics of 
experience, evidenced in Lenin’s own remarkable late works, such as “Left-Wing” Communism: 
An Infantile Disorder (1920) and “Notes of a Publicist” (1922).7 Already engaging in preserving 
the emancipatory project he participated in unleashing, Lenin would speculatively if tentatively 
write in 1920, “we already have considerable international experience which very definitely 
shows that some of the fundamental features of our revolution have a significance which is not 
local, not peculiarly national, not Russian only, but international.”8  
 
*** 
 
What the repetition of 1917 here (and in 2017) entails is not so much ourselves revisiting 
the event (—much less repeating Lenin’s gesture) as it consists of ‘history’ imposing itself upon 
us via repetition. Being subject to this exogenous repetition, 1917/2017, we run the risk of not 
being ready on account of our anxiety vis-à-vis an object we are not in control of. This ‘object’ is 
history, understood here (minimally) as the alien, quasi-autonomous unfolding of an immanent 
necessity despite its determinacy as emergent under conditions of capitalist modernity. History in 
this former sense continues apace despite past postmodern attempts to declare the ‘end of 
history,’ utterances which emerged distinctly in the late-twentieth century with the thawing of 
the Cold War and the final collapse of the Soviet Union, among other trajectories and historical 
junctures. If 9/11 did not falsify this master-narrative, then the 2016 election of Donald Trump, 
Brexit, the recrudescence of neo-nationalisms and the political crisis of late-neoliberalism have 
proven—in no matter how mystified a manner—that the course of history is still reroutable and, 
                                                   
7 In Luxemburg’s final writings, we also encounter a turn to speculation in response to defeat; see Luxemburg, 
“Order Prevails in Berlin” (1918). 
8 Lenin, LWC, 7. 
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more fundamentally, that the world can be other than it is and has been. 
That the relevance and legacy of 1917 has to be actively retrieved and construed in our 
contemporary moment seems to be the greatest indicator of what the Russian Revolution means 
for the present, in 2017. What 1917 ‘means’ for the present, I would argue, is fundamentally 
obscure and unclear. When approaching this immense event today, one experiences the prima 
facie distance and dissociation of our contemporary moment from arguably the most profound 
attempt to change the modern world that has ever taken place. 1917 can thus be understood 
allegorically as a mirror that reflects the present; it reveals this present, for instance, as not 
revolutionary—as perhaps not even emphatically reformist; worse, maybe even sub-reformist, 
with no sight of emphatic social transformation on the horizon. Even the profundity of 1917, it 
seems, has become obscured; and so this incomprehensibility forces us to work our way back 
into the problem of inheriting its legacy. As I will seek to explicate, Adorno’s life-work, which 
he described in terms of  “messages in bottles” (Flaschenposten), offers us one line to this past.9  
 
*** 
 
Lenin engaged in what Adorno calls “open thinking” when he wrote above on the 
universal significance of the Russian Revolution in 1920, amidst his and early Soviet Russia’s 
retreat from world revolution into geopolitical isolation, culminating in the Thermidorian 
adaptation to and internalization of defeat via Stalin’s putative socialism in one country.10 (—
Here we keep open the gap that has been closed shut again and again.) Lenin leaves the 
international importance of the Russian Revolution vague—and purposefully so. Indeed, while 
Lenin asserts the universal significance of the dwindling experience to which he bears witness 
and reconstructs in “Left-Wing” Communism, he nevertheless acknowledges the “tremendous 
                                                   
9 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 209. 
10 Adorno, CM, 293; Lenin, LWC, 7. 
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difference between backward Russia and the advanced countries of Western Europe.”11 Thus in 
retracing the Bolshevik experience to uncover its truth content while still grasping the 
particularity of the Russian experience, Lenin echoes Kant for whom “critique means less to call 
into question than to establish the universal principles for how something is possible.”12  
Along with “Notes to a Publicist” and other of Lenin’s late works before his death in 
1924, “Left-Wing” Communism is a work of auto-critique and, more modestly, self-clarification 
during retreat after the failure of “world revolution” ca. 1917–1919/23.13 Lenin spoke of but did 
not mystically predict the repetition of this event; indeed the title of the opening chapter of “Left-
Wing” Communism is explicitly reflexive: “In What Sense Can We Speak of the International 
Significance of the Russian Revolution?” Nevertheless, Lenin comes close here to almost 
speaking in a prophetic, eschatological tone; the “Russian model,” he writes, “reveals to all 
countries something, and something very essential, of their near and inevitable future.”14 
Adorno’s final published essay “Resignation” (1969) echoes Lenin’s “Left-Wing” 
Communism most notably15 in one of its closing passages: 
Whatever has once been thought can be suppressed, forgotten, can vanish. But it cannot 
be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the element of the universal. 
What once was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by others: this confidence 
accompanies even the most solitary and powerless thought.16 
 
Such a gesture of holding open that which has been previously thwarted is expressed 
                                                   
11 Lenin, LWC, 7. 
12 Wayne, Red Kant,1. 
13 Lenin, LWC 84. 
14 Lenin, LWC, 7. 
15 Adorno’s “Resignation” also echoes Lenin’s critique of the anarchist and so-called ‘left-wing communist’ 
tendencies that emerged in the wake of the October Russian Revolution and the closure of world-shaping praxis. In 
“Left-Wing” Communism Lenin is speaking topically to the regression of Marxism into anarchism that resulted from 
the historical failure of Marxism. As Adorno writes in “Resignation,” “formerly progressive organizations that now 
in all countries of the earth are developing the characteristic traits of what they once opposed. Yet this does not 
invalidate the critique of anarchism. Its return is that of a ghost. The impatience with theory that manifests itself in 
its return does not advance thought beyond itself. By forgetting thought, the impatience falls back below it” 
(Adorno, CM, 292). 
16 Lenin, LWC, 19–20.  
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earlier by Adorno and with greater intensity in his Negative Dialectics (1966) in a passage that 
could be taken as an instance of the imputed ‘left melancholy’ or “a priori pain” of Adorno’s 
thought: 
Those who chide theory [as] anachronistic obey the topos of dismissing, as obsolete, 
what remains painful [because it was] thwarted…What has been cast aside but not 
absorbed theoretically will often yield its truth content only later. It festers as a sore on 
the prevailing health; this will lead back to it in changed situations.17 
 
What this sore might lead us back to if approached immanently, I will argue, is what is at 
stake in Adorno’s self-described “messages in a bottle.” In a manuscript that was begun in 1942, 
Adorno and Horkheimer would write of their collaborative work as a “message [Rede]” 
addressed to an “imaginary witness…to whom we can pass it on—lest it perish with us.”18 In 
1956, Adorno and Horkheimer further clarify their project of disseminating messages in a bottle: 
[Horkheimer]…two sources of uncertainty are involved, if we continue to operate in the 
realm of theory. Firstly, because what is produced in the way of theory no longer has 
anything in common with Marx, with the most advanced class consciousness; our 
thoughts are no longer a function of the proletariat. Secondly, it seems then as if we are 
working on a theory for keeping in stock. 
[Adorno] In the best case, it is theory as a message in a bottle. 
[Horkheimer] In stock. Perhaps the time will come again when theory can be of use. A 
theory that has ceased to have any connection with practice is art. What we need to 
respond to is the question of whether we are doing philosophy as pure construct.19 
 
                                                   
17 Sloterdijk, CCR, xxxiii; Adorno, ND, 144. 
18 Müller-Doohm, Adorno, 277. “In view of what is now threatening to engulf Europe…our present work is 
essentially destined to pass things down through the night that is approaching: a kind of message in a bottle” 
(Horkheimer quoted in Müller-Doohm, Adorno, 262). Adorno will reiterate this image in his work on Kafka and The 
Hunter Gracchus, expressing here the tendency for such disseminated messages to themselves decay: “The best, 
which is forgotten, is remembered and imprisoned in a bottle like the Cumaean sibyl. Except that in the process it 
changes into the worst: ‘I want to die,’ and that is denied it. Made eternal, the transient is overtaken by a curse” 
(Adorno, COL, 219). We should note the resemblance between Adorno and Horkheimer’s image of messages in a 
bottle (symbolic of theory divorced from praxis) and Paul Celan’s account of the poem after Auschwitz: “A poem, 
as a manifestation of language and thus essentially dialogue, can be a message in a bottle, sent out in the—not 
always greatly hopeful—belief that somewhere and sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps. 
Poems in this sense too are under way: they are making toward something” (Celan, Paul Celan, 115). Ingeborg 
Bachmann similarly expresses this situation of language in her poem “Waiting Room”: “Language no longer unites. 
/ What we share is waiting. / A chair / a bench / a window / through which light falls / into our room / onto our 
hands / onto our eyes / and also / onto the floor. / Heal our eyes / so that we again find words, / bright ones that I can 
say to you” (Bachmann, Darkness Spoken, 353). 
19 Adorno & Horkheimer, “Towards a New Manifesto?”, 59. 
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As we will explore, these cryptic utterances—much like those of Lenin above—are ones 
of preservation as much as they are of retreat; they are expressions of preservation amidst 
retreat.20  
Nietzsche insists in “On the Uses and Abuse of History for Life” (1873) that we must 
come to see the work of “historical writing,” which a priori revisits and thus repeats, as 
potentially creative:  
as long as the past must be written about as worthy of imitation, as capable of being 
imitated, with the possibility of a second occurrence, history is definitely in danger of 
becoming somewhat altered, reinterpreted into something beautiful, and thus coming 
close to free poeticizing.21 
 
Indeed, following Benjamin’s idea of origin (Ursprung) as a “maelstrom” (Strudel) that 
emerges out of the “flow of becoming,” to recover the complex emergence (Entstehung) of a past 
event a priori implicates us in its potential repetition—however far removed or distantly echoed 
and transmuted this reiteration may be.22  
 
II. Last Gasps for Air  
Lenin’s German counterpart23 Rosa Luxemburg was spared from living through the 
barbarism she presaged if, as she warned, proletarian socialism—over and against petty-
bourgeois democracy, or worse—was not attained.24 The barbarism she foresaw would result in 
but would not be restricted to the blossoming of fascism across Europe, another World War and 
                                                   
20 Lenin’s self-conscious retreat is expressed, for instance, in his turn to allegory to express early Soviet Russia’s 
cul-de-sac; see “By Way of Example” in “Notes to a Publicist.” 
21 Nietzsche, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. 
22 Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 45; Samuel Weber amended trans. “[T]he gesture which tries to recover, distances from-
by itself, it grows ever more distant…Identification is a difference to itself, a difference from-with itself” (Derrida, 
Derrida & Education, 56).  
23 See Rosa Luxemburg’s The Mass Strike, “What is German Bolshevism?” and other writings on the Russian 
Revolutions. 
24 Luxemburg quotes Engels in “The Crisis of Social Democracy” (1915): “Friedrich Engels once said, bourgeois 
society confronts a dilemma: either the transition to socialism or relapse into barbarism. What does a ‘relapse into 
barbarism’ mean at our height of European civilization?…This world war—this is a relapse into barbarism” 
(Luxemburg quoted in Adorno, CM, 386). 
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the unspeakable horrors of the twentieth century. While her own gruesome death had little effect 
on the then-dwindling German Revolution, Shane Haffner describes her murder as the most 
“historically potent event in the drama of the German Revolution” in his detailed history Failure 
of Revolution: Germany 1918–19: “viewed now from almost a century later [her death] has 
acquired something of the uncanny, incalculably far reaching effect of the event on Golgotha—
which likewise seemed to make little difference when it happened.”25 Despite the posthumous 
caricatures that have taken hold of Lenin and Luxemburg (authoritarian and voluntarist, 
respectively) both figures, through their post-histories, have become allegories and signposts to 
the respective but interrelated German and Russian revolutionary experiences, which were 
ultimately abortive.26 
Bolshevism advanced, but did not solve of course, the twin crises of Marxism (as a 
politics) and imperialist global capitalism (the latter evidenced by the lead-up to, outbreak, and 
aftermath of the First World War) by seeing these crises as opportunities for transformation. 
Lenin’s call to turn the world war amongst capitalist nation-states into a global “civil war” 
between classes, and therethrough into a “world revolution,” sought to work through the failures 
of the Second International (which had developed up until the outbreak of WWI, from 1889–
1914)27 by radicalizing Marxism via Bolshevism in changed conditions.28 This, to be sure, is 
Lenin’s great, ambivalent gesture29 of seeing such defeat and crisis as—however 
                                                   
25 Haffner, Failure of Revolution, 140. 
26 See Trotsky’s “The Transitional Program” (1938) and his other writings on the assessment of the failed German 
Revolutions.  
27 “‘Since August 4, 1914, German Social-Democracy has been a stinking corpse’—this statement will make Rosa 
Luxemburg’s name famous in the history of the international working class movement” (Lenin, “Notes of a 
Publicist”). In Lenin, Lukács remarks how “the different attitudes of the various socialist currents in 1914 were the 
direct, logical consequences of their theoretical, tactical, and other positions up till then” (Lukács, Lenin, 40; no 
emphasis). See Joll, The Second International (1955). 
28 Lukács, Lenin, 49; Lenin, LWC, 84. 
29 By ‘gesture’ I mean a delimited but irreducible act that calls to be grasped in both its becoming—i.e., its 
movement or tendential opening-out-onto—and also its being-cut-short in becoming, i.e., its incompletion. Gesture 
here and elsewhere in this thesis is also intended to emphasize the interpenetration of practice and theory, or action 
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counterintuitively—opening up the space for advancing and deepening the crisis of capitalism, 
and for pursuing possible transformation and potential freedom.  
In 1919, two years after the Bolshevik seizure of state power, the prospect of socialist 
world revolution would be firmly closed off by the failure of the German Revolution and the 
symbolic murder of Luxemburg, leading to increased Soviet isolation. Bringing to a halt the 
‘permanent revolution’ that Trotsky and, following him, Lenin postulated as the condition of 
possibility for a successful world revolution in the tendential direction of socialism, the failure of 
the German Revolution marked the beginning of the end of ‘classical Marxism.’ The latter can 
be defined as the historical continuity that spans from Marx and Engels (ca. 184830) to Lenin, 
Luxemburg and ends roughly with Trotsky’s assassination in 1940—a continuity which these 
later figures could still lay claim to and cite.31  Yet of course Trotskyism had already become an 
untenable form of revolutionary politics before the time of Trotsky’s tragic death.  
In the wake of such defeat, Trotskyism and Frankfurt School-Critical Theory would both 
assume the task of sustaining the moment of crisis and heightened critical (i.e., non-identical) 
consciousness that was attained in 1917. Both would attempt to work through the crises and 
failures of Bolshevism and the German Revolution,32 and more broadly, Marxism ca. 1914–
1924, albeit in different and divergent forms and settings, and in radically changed geopolitical 
circumstances. In his retrospective essay “Those Twenties” (1963), Adorno explicitly voices a 
perspective of tendential world revolution that aligns with the revolutionary purview of Lenin, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and self-understanding, in the supercharged historical ‘moment.’ This gestural character of action is invoked when 
one speaks of, for instance, ‘Lenin in 1917.’ Addressing Lenin thus, Lukács writes, “[i]t was left to Lenin to make 
the step from theory to practice; a step which is simultaneously—and this should never be forgotten—a theoretical 
advance” (Lukács, Lenin, 46). See Slaughter, “What is Revolutionary Leadership?” which elaborates Lenin’s 
developments for both Marxian theory and praxis. 
30 In the essay “Society,” Adorno describes the critical concept of society as originating “around 1848” (Adorno, 
“Society,” 10–11). 
31 See Luxemberg, “On the Spartacus Program” (1918).  
32 See Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour, xi–xii. 
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Luxemburg and Trotsky: 
Already in the twenties, as a consequence of the events of [the failure of the German 
Revolution in] 1919, the decision had fallen against that political potential that, had 
things gone otherwise, with great probability would have influenced developments in 
Russia and prevented Stalinism.33 
 
 
III. Late-Marxism: Separation Anxiety 
It is always the case that whenever thinkers as powerful as Marx or Hegel or Kant arrive 
at an impasse it is not a good idea to be too clever in resolving the resulting antinomies. 
In general, it is far better to assure oneself of the necessity of such antinomies. 
                            —Adorno34 
 
In the unraveling of Marxism as a distinct, recognizable and sui generis form of politics35 
(Lenin and Luxemburg, as both Korsch and Lukács argue (1923), offering some of the most 
compelling embodiments of this breed of politics), which took place leading up to and 
surrounding the outbreak of WWI and the resultant splintering of the Second International—of 
which the politics and writings of Lenin and Luxemburg stand as two departures and radical 
immanent critiques—Marxism is transmuted (minimally) into a problem of theory and praxis, 
whose coerced unity (e.g., socialist realism, Diamat, etc.) represents the regression of this form 
of non-identical politics, which from here enters into deep crisis. (As we will explore below, the 
works of Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer ca. 1940–42 offer historical contextualizations of 
this crisis, a crisis admittedly much deeper than that contained within the static theory/praxis 
antinomy.) To be sure, constellating (in theory) ‘theory and praxis’ is necessarily an echo and 
reduction of what historically constituted a dynamic exchange between (broadly speaking) 
theory and praxis, e.g., as seen in Lenin and Luxemburg’s lived politics and writings. Such a 
                                                   
33 Adorno, CM, 43. 
34 Adorno, LND, 51. 
35 “[D]istinguished from the greater 19th century history of socialism, from the Utopians to Proudhon, Blanqui, 
Lassalle, Bakunin, et al. that had developed in the preceding period, from 1875–1914” (Cutrone, “The Century of 
Marxism,” 1). 
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decoupling, resulting from the above historical break, will compel late-Marxian theory to remark 
upon its own ipseity and insufficiency in the face of its categorical antithesis, praxis, which 
Adorno argues “appears in theory merely, and indeed necessarily, as a blind spot.”36  
In a strong sense, amidst this dwindling (to critical consciousness) crisis, theory and 
praxis become in disagreement following the historical failure of Marxism (minimally, the 
historical self-consciousness of the Left) and thereby the Left. Adorno will write that “[t]hey 
[theory and praxis] stand in a polar relationship.”37 In their antinomy, each pole gnaws on its 
antithesis; yet Adorno does not lament this “separation”38:  
If, to make an exception for once, one risks what is called a grand perspective, beyond 
the historical differences in which the concepts of theory and praxis have their life, one 
discovers the infinitely progressive aspect of the separation of theory and praxis, which 
was deplored by the Romantics and denounced in their wake by the Socialists—except 
for the mature Marx.39  
 
Holding the historically determinate and fluctuating poles of theory and praxis together, 
along with their respective demands, allows us to preserve, if only in altered and transmuted 
form, the minimal structure of this historical dialectics at a standstill. (All the while not 
forgetting spontaneity and what Adorno calls the “spontaneous moment”: “theory and praxis are 
neither immediately one nor absolutely different…their relation is one of discontinuity. No 
continuous path leads from praxis to theory—what has to be added is what is called the 
spontaneous moment.”40)  
                                                   
36 Adorno, CM, 278.  
37 Ibid., 277. 
38 In “Little Hans” from Minima Moralia, Adorno portrays the work of bourgeois intellectuals as being marred by 
this contradiction. 
39 Adorno, CM, 266. The “separation” or contradiction between these poles, it should be stressed, “cannot be settled 
by reflection; it is the constitution of reality that dictates the contradiction”—thus pointing to the necessity of 
changing reality, social reality, itself (Adorno, CM, 4). 
40 Adorno, CM, 276; see Adorno’s Lectures on Negative Dialectics on Luxemburg, spontaneity and organization. 
We should note here that Adorno’s late work, such as “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” brings to the fore not only 
what is latent in Adorno’s corpus but also the stakes of his thought. Both are also evident in his late letter 
correspondence with Herbert Marcuse, where the figures engage in a debate over the politics of the Institute for 
Social Research, and Critical Theory more broadly. While Marcuse argues the contemporary (late ‘60s) tasks of 
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The above standstill can be expressed figuratively by the passage from Marx back to a 
constellation of Hegel with Kant, with Marx nevertheless on the speculative horizon. More 
precisely, philosophy can preserve Marxism, which is itself one step removed—as classical 
Marxism understood it41—from philosophy, but only through a constitutive breakdown and 
decoupling: through the regression of dialectics to (unsublatable) antinomies, which late-
Marxian critique seeks to bring to light and express as moments of a regressive social totality, 
containing nevertheless—however latently—emancipatory potential by way of the 
nonsynchronous working through of such reified forms of appearance. Through its misfire, 
Marxism is forced to become a problem of philosophy and thereby becomes entangled with the 
latter. Such an entanglement is expressed in Korsch’s Marxism and Philosophy on the 
disagreement of Marxism and philosophy, and Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, which can be 
understood as a further retreat into philosophy from Korsch’s suspension of Marxism and 
philosophy.42 
 
IV. Turn to Immanence 
Having failed on world-historical proportions, Marxism is compelled to undergo 
immanent criticism, which is the work Hegel classically assigned to philosophy vis-à-vis religion 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Critical Theory are discontinuous with those of the ‘30s (when the Institute for Social Research was founded)—
writing, “our (old) theory has an internal political content, an internal political dynamic, that today, more than ever 
before, compels us to concrete political positions…we have to write and act differently today than in the thirties”—
Adorno, by contrast, affirms such continuity (Adorno & Marcuse, “Correspondence on the German Student 
Movement,” 129). Marcuse, in a later letter, would acquiesce to Adorno’s position, writing, “[a]ll that may not 
amount to very much, but there is no revolutionary situation in the most advanced industrialized countries, and the 
degree of integration simply delimits new, very unorthodox forms of radical opposition” (Ibid., 133). 
41 See, for instance, Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886). 
42 Like Korsch, Adorno holds open the possibility that philosophy can abolish itself; in so doing he claims 
inheritance of the tradition of Marx and Marxism. Adorno’s famous opening line from Negative Dialectics reiterates 
Korsch’s contention in Marxism and Philosophy that “[p]hilosophy cannot be abolished without being realized” 
(Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 97). 
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and art in his Aesthetics.43 This historically conditioned self-comprehension of Marxism would 
crucially incorporate psychoanalysis, the language and discourse of unconditional suffering 
under conditions of modernity wherein ostensibly anything can and should be said (by anyone).44 
Such a critical employment of psychoanalysis was purveyed by figures such as Georg Simmel, 
Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst Bloch and most forcefully by Wilhelm Reich, whose early work The 
Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933) prefigured much later late-Marxism in its dialectical 
intertwining of social theory (the philosophy of history, Marxism, sociology, etc.) with 
psychology (psychoanalysis, social and group psychology, etc.).45 This specific interdisciplinary 
constellation would later be classically articulated in Adorno’s “Sociology and Psychology” 
(1955). The psychoanalytic turn in and resultant psychoanalytic dimension of Critical Theory 
was codified with Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) which 
undertook, among other projects, a deep archaeology of the modern bourgeois subject in 
response to the barbarisms of the early twentieth century.46  
Minimally, and to recapitulate, Adornian negative dialectics is an attempt to both 
preserve the problem of the historical and geopolitical failure of Marxism (implicating thereby 
the entire preceding history of the Left stemming from 1848) and to hold open and point, 
perhaps, to Marxism’s reconstitution and reinauguration as a tendential revolutionary politics. 
However, again, like History and Class Consciousness and Marxism and Philosophy (1923), 
Adornian negative dialectics is a theoretical exploration of this problematic, and hence finds 
                                                   
43 Marxism lives on because its proper task of bringing about a post-capitalist society remains unfinished, 
compelling it, as Adorno writes, “to criticize itself without restraint” (Adorno, LND, 183). 
44 See Derrida, “Psychoanalysis Searches the States of Its Soul” and Bloch, “Heritage of our Times.” 
45 See specifically Reich’s essay “Ideology as Material Power.” Adorno will note, echoing Reich, that “[w]ithout 
psychology, in which the objective constraints are continually internalized anew, it would be impossible to 
understand how people passively accept a state of unchanging destructive irrationality and, moreover, how they 
integrate themselves into movements that stand in rather obvious contradiction to their own interests” (Adorno, CM, 
271) 
46 As Robert Hullot-Kentor reminds us, Adorno “was among the first to address the philosophical dimensions and 
implications of psychoanalysis” (Hullot-Kentor, TBR, 10). 
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itself already bound up in the historico-philosophical (and however distantly, political) 
unraveling of the tenuous “umbilical cord” Marx posited between theory and praxis, which 
already led Marx himself to appropriately underscore in his “Theses on Feuerbach” (1845) “the 
this-sidedness of…thinking” in the face of praxis.47 
 In the long aftermath issuing from 1917, Benjamin—before his own premature and tragic 
death in flight of the Nazis (agents of the counter-revolution, and worse)—would contemplate 
and engage in writing history from the vantage of the vanquished; and not simply the working 
class as such but from the purview of those who had struggled to overcome capital but had failed 
and/or had been betrayed in their attempts to do so. Of the latter, Rosa Luxemburg would be the 
most tragic case, whom Benjamin would cite in his “On The Concept of History.” Benjamin’s 
provocation of writing history from the standpoint of those who had failed to transform the world 
would be recast by Adorno throughout his work, in critical objectification and more 
hermetically, as “the unconscious writing of history.”48 To be sure, reading history against the 
grain means, for both of these figures, reading history pathologically, i.e., through the lens of a 
symptomatology that professes an avowed object-dependence to natural-historical regression. 
Beyond these tasks of critical historiography (to be sure, a form of anti-historiography), Adorno 
would also notably import Benjamin’s insights into the domain of philosophy proper, arguing 
that “knowledge must [also]…present the fatally rectilinear succession of victory and defeat.”49 
In spite of the seductions of dogmatic left-hermeneutics and the eschatologies of a certain 
‘vulgar’ type of Marxism, the present is not legible in its entirety via a philosophy of the history 
of the Left, seeing the tradition of the Left has, historically, privileged and thus excluded certain 
voices over others. Nevertheless, it seems that any serious attempt to understand the 
                                                   
47 Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, 59; Marx, Marx-Engels Reader, 144. 
48 Adorno, AT, 261. 
49 Adorno, Minima Moralia, 152. 
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intransigence of the present, that is, the world as praxis-resistant (to speak nothing of the 
regressive social forces that seem well at work today, not only on subjective and neo-national but 
also on geopolitical levels), must work through this troubling and deep unconscious history of 
the Left in the twentieth century that leads to the present. From the perceived need of such an 
immanent history of the Left, which philosophical history methodologically and 
epistemologically makes possible, Adorno’s corpus will be of historical interest to us (and as we 
will also see, of an interdisciplinary and therefore unconditional interest), insofar as his work 
seems to dialectically register, both explictly and negatively, the decline of world-shaping praxis 
and thereby the decline of the Left.  
We should note, however, that Adorno’s work is not uniquely singular in this above 
historical dimension. A similar case could be made for the corpuses of Cornelius Castoriadis and 
Murray Bookchin, for instance, as they also critically register the post-1914–1923 historical 
experience and its long aftermath, as well as the emergence of new forms of Left politics that 
draw and/or break from past forms of such politics. For our purposes here, however, Adorno’s 
negative dialectic productively stands at a certain historical crossroads, cresting with his death in 
1969 before the post-‘60s–70s/New Left emergence of postmodernism and the global 
transformations of neoliberalism took hold, but whose proper historical experience reaches as far 
back as the 1910’s and ‘20s. In Adorno’s turn to immanence and philosophy (as we have seen, 
for instance, to inherit and comprehend the failure of Marxism) the external world is refracted in 
his work, yet only negatively—thus necessitating further criticism to decode such immanence, 
which will constitute our task here.  
 
 
  20 
V. Dialectics of Defeat 
In terms of Adorno’s contemporary reception, one of the most fruitful and provocative 
engagements with his work has come from the Platypus Affiliated Society (PAS), an 
organization originating from the University of Chicago and the courses of the late Moishe 
Postone that is avowedly founded for “the reconstitution of Critical Theory.”50 One of the PAS’s 
central theses that draws from Adorno is its so-called “dialectics of defeat,” which seeks to make 
legible the decline or natural history of the Left over the course of the twentieth century, on the 
levels of both social being and consciousness.51 (In Negative Dialectics, Adorno would describe 
the “objectivity of historic life” as “that of natural history,” in other words, a history that tends 
toward sedimentation rather than self-overcoming.52) Of its many stages and moments of 
devolution and decomposition, the parallel constructed between Adorno-Critical Theory and 
Trotsky-Trotskyism is one the PAS’s most compelling and productive analyses—a historical 
constellation we have already begun constructing above.  
By the 1930s, Karl Korsch and Georg Lukács—arguably the two most important 
theoreticians of not only the post-1914–19 crisis and failure but also of the inroads made by 
Lenin and Luxemburg on the levels of both theory and praxis—had either become fervently anti-
Soviet (Korsch), or had weakened and adapted to Stalinism (Lukács).53 Yet Trotsky and his 
movement stood standing in their attempt to reroute the failed world revolution and thereby 
claim fidelity to the Russian Revolution; and the Institute for Social Research, founded in the 
wake of the failed German Revolution, laid claim at its outset to the politics of Korsch and 
Lukács’ works from the early ‘20s, approaching both of them (unsuccessfully) to head the 
                                                   
50 Leonard, et al., “The Decline of the Left in the 20th Century,” 2. 
51 Ibid., 1. 
52 Adorno, ND, 354. 
53 See Müller-Doohm, Adorno, 94. 
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Institute. Adorno (arguably the Institute’s most robust representative) and Trotsky thus become, 
as myth has often had it, last men standing: Trotsky, the last defender of the Russian Revolution; 
and Adorno, the lone champion of Hegelian-Marxism within German philosophy and sociology. 
Indeed, Adorno’s work from beginning to end54 sought to sustain the insights of the earlier 
Hegelian-Marxist tradition of Lukács and Korsch, which were born of what Korsch called “the 
crisis of Marxism” and the abortive revolutions of the early twentieth century. 
The distant but nonetheless affirmed affinity between Adorno and Lenin55 lies in the 
former’s attempt to sustain the moment of crisis for critical consciousness and to hold in 
constellation the once-empathic mediation, now broken-down, between theory and praxis that 
Lukács and Korsch also sought to sustain in the immediate wake of Lenin and Luxemburg, 
1914–1919/1924. Trotskyism is in many ways the torn half of Adornian Critical Theory. What 
Trotskyism displays on the level of praxis—in its long disintegration: the becoming-impossible 
and -farcical of this putatively revolutionary politics, as a result not the least of the counter-
revolutionary effects of international capital—is what Adorno’s corpus inversely registers on the 
level of theory: the retreat from praxis into the strongholds of theory. More broadly, however, 
Adorno’s work indexes the natural-historical becoming-ossified of both theory and praxis into 
the antinomy we have posed hitherto. As Adorno explicates, “[t]here is much to speak for the 
                                                   
54 See fn. 40. 
55 In his discussion with Horkheimer apropos a possible rewriting of the Communist Manifesto, Adorno expresses 
his intentions directly: “I have always wanted to…develop a theory that remains faithful to Marx, Engels and 
Lenin”; Horkheimer responds affirmatively, “Who would not subscribe to that?” (Adorno & Horkheimer, “Towards 
a New Manifesto?” 103). To be sure, it is crucial to strive to comprehend what such pithy utterances presuppose. 
Several letters from Adorno to Horkheimer and Benjamin in the late ‘30’s evidence Adorno’s positive attitude 
towards to Lenin, such as when Adorno writes Benjamin, “I would offer you the slogan ‘Leninist Auto-critique’” 
(Adorno & Benjamin, Complete Correspondence, 181). Chris Cutrone has argued that “[o]ne clear explanation for 
Adorno’s ‘Leninism’ was the importance of consciousness in Adorno’s estimation of potential for emancipatory 
social transformation” (Cutrone, “Politics of Critical Theory,” 3). In a letter to Horkheimer concerning Erich 
Fromm’s work, Adorno writes, “I would strongly advise him to read Lenin,” adding that Fromm’s work poses a 
“real threat to the line…which the [Institute for Social Research’s] journal takes” (Adorno quoted in Wiggershaus, 
Frankfurt School, 266). In his 1936 epistolary response to Benajmin’s “Work of Art” essay, Adorno describes it as 
“among the profoundest and most powerful statements of political theory that I have encountered since I read 
[Lenin’s] The State and Revolution” (Adorno & Benjamin, Complete Correspondence, 132–3). 
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fact that cognition, whose possible relation to a transforming praxis is at least momentarily 
crippled, would not in itself be any sort of blessing. Praxis is put off and cannot wait; theory, too, 
ails from this.”56 
Adorno’s retreat and resultant cul-de-sac57 are registered, for instance, in his argument 
that it is in the “interest of praxis itself” “that theory should win back its independence.”58 Yet 
here Adorno’s retreat into theory (over and against praxis) should not be confused with a 
Heideggerian, let alone the post-Heideggerian, retreat into thinking contra institutionalized/ 
academic philosophy. Upon general-historical consideration, Adorno’s work becomes salient and 
productive the extent to which it understands itself dialectically as only theory, or weak theory. 
Perhaps what is most remarkable about the objectivated historical experience that is latent in 
Adorno’s corpus is not its how’s or why’s but its very availability. 
 
VI. Adorno as Archi-Writing  
To reiterate, Adorno’s work now appears to trace and capture, however liminally or 
indirectly, the problematic of the introjection of failure and defeat of self-determining 
subjectivity and world-shaping collective praxis by means of his dialectical intertwining of 
critically applied psychology and sociology. Through such tarrying (or being-beside-oneself), 
Adorno’s corpus (in hindsight) appears to disinterestedly register—in the longue durée—the 
decline of the Left in the twentieth century and thereby at the same time stands as a path by 
which to recuperate this entropic history. (Such recuperation, as we will see, is made possible not 
in the least by Adorno’s (like Benjamin’s) assimilation of the concepts of decay and transience—
                                                   
56 Adorno, ND, 245. 
57 See Comay, Mourning Sickness, 150, on the antinomies of Adorno’s cul-de-sac. 
58 In “The Authoritarian State,” Horkheimer also signals a provisional retreat into theory when he writes how 
“[t]hought itself is already a sign of resistance, the effort to keep oneself from being deceived any longer. Thought is 
not absolutely opposed to command and obedience but sets them for the time being in relationship to the task of 
making freedom a reality. This relationship is in danger” (Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State,” 116–7). 
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and more broadly, a philosophical concept of experience—into his thinking.)  
Crucially, Adorno’s work registers not only how objective circumstances (for instance, 
failure and defeat) can foreclose subjective possibilities via psychic introjection, but also how 
subjective states-of-affairs can close off—on account of hypercathected psychic entrenchments 
and calcified libidinal investments—subjective possibilities and psychic availability and thereby 
objective, worldly possibilities. This is why psychoanalysis became essential for Adorno—to 
overcome such sedimented enclosures wedded to a non-negotiable past, which molds the present 
and future tenses. In his critical embrace and employment of psychoanalysis, Adorno’s work 
indicates that self-determining collective praxis may be unthinkable without self-constituting, 
‘strong’ subjects. As he would put it grossly but succintly in his essay “Is Marx Obsolete?” 
(1968), “the signature of the age [late-capitalism] is the predominance of the relations of 
production over the forces of production.”59 This thought-figure expresses, in Marxian 
categories, the problematic of the regression of consciousness: minimally, that consciousness can 
adapt and adjust itself to its objective social circumstances, instead of pushing the envelope 
further.  
Yet how, might we ask, can a figure who is so clearly not emphatically Marxist or openly 
leftist have anything meaningful to say about the history of the Left and/or Marxism?  To be 
sure, Adorno’s imputed Marxism or leftism lies not in a manic or critical heroism. His pertinence 
for putative Left politics rather lies in his work’s eloquence and the prima facie cryptic character 
of his work, which points beyond the said proper to the saying itself via equivocal enunciation.60 
An Adornian Marxism/leftism may thus seem a mere academic eccentricity, destined for only 
further hermeticism and compounded esotericism. But this might only appear to be the case so 
                                                   
59 Adorno, COL, 119. 
60 See Adorno, Hegel, 116. 
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long as we have not received his disseminated messages. As we will explore, Adorno’s work is 
compelling first and foremost as a certain dialectical preservationism which is nevertheless 
concerned primarily with the emergence of the new.  
While Adorno’s meditations on non-identity and theory and praxis may not seem to relate 
prima facie in any clear way to the history of the Left, a more heretical reader of Adorno such as 
the art historian T.J. Clarke has argued that Adorno’s entire “lifetime [was] spent” “building ever 
more elaborate conceptual trenches to outflank the [later] Third International,” i.e., the Stalinized 
Third International. (As Adorno writes in “Resignation,” speaking to the effects of the 
Stalinization of the Left, “formerly progressive organizations…now in all countries of the earth 
are developing the characteristic traits of what they once opposed”61). Similarly, the radical 
Marxist critic of Adorno, Chris Cutrone has boldly if perhaps grossly contended that Adorno 
“considered his work—indeed, his entire life experience—to be a function of the aftermath of 
this failure of Marxism that conditioned subsequent history”; more precisely, a function, Cutrone 
writes, of “the defeat of the global uprising of 1917–19 at the end of World War I in which 
avowedly Marxist political organizations took part, the series of revolutions in Russia, Germany, 
Hungary and Italy.”62 
Yet the politics of Adorno’s work, much like those of Benjamin’s, are no doubt cryptic 
and weak—and avowedly so. Their collective works do not heroically profess an overt politics (a 
tendential worldly orientation) but rather embody and proffer a pre-politics concerning the very 
conditions of im/possibility for emancipatory politics. Politics where self-determining subjects 
form collectives and democratically act in concert with one another; politics when “those who 
                                                   
61 Clarke, “Should Benjamin Have Read Marx?”, 41; Adorno, CM, 292. Cutrone notes how the ‘30s witnessed “the 
transformation of Marxism in Stalinism…Stalinism [would] flourish as the Marxism of the post-World War II 
period…[which Adorno] regard[ed] as a sign of the regression of Marxism itself” (Cutrone, “Politics of Critical 
Theory,” 4).  
62 Cutrone, Adorno’s Marxism, 137–8. 
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‘have no’ time take the time necessary to front up as inhabitants of a common space and 
demonstrate that their mouths really do emit speech capable of making pronouncements on the 
common which cannot be reduced to voices signaling pain.”63 To be sure, decoding the imputed 
politics of Adorno’s corpus is as difficult as attempting to identify, for instance, the precise 
political content of Benjamin’s unfinished Arcades Project. Given these hermeneutical 
difficulties, Osborne and Charles’ following account of the politics of Benjamin’s work will also 
be instructive for approaching those of Adorno’s:  
Benjamin remarked that his break from the Youth Movement did not constitute the 
abandonment of this earlier thought, however, but its submergence into a ‘harder, purer, 
more invisible radicalism.’ This in part accounts for what T.J. Clark describes as the 
‘cryptic’ character of—what Adorno termed—the anthropological materialism of The 
Arcades Project, where, Clark comments, it is ‘as if such a politics were being actively 
aired and developed elsewhere.’64   
 
By reading Adorno’s own ‘invisible’ politics “associatively,” we will attempt to grasp—
as Adorno wrote apropos Hegel—“the compelling force of the objective phenomena that have 
been reflected in his philosophy and are sedimented in it.”65  
 
 
VII. Politics of Experience        
In order to decipher and unfold the politics of Adorno’s work, his work must be 
approached immanently. This is not the least to guard against the common tendency to hijack his 
messages in a bottle, by means of which all disparate roads apparently lead to Adorno’s 
Marxism. As Benjamin would write Adorno in a letter dated July 17, 1931, “it is a question not 
simply of ‘applying’ Marxism like a coat of fresh paint, but rather of working with it, and that 
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means, for all of us, struggling with it.”66 Our posing the question of Adorno’s disseminated 
messages has not been and will hopefully not be a pretext for us to reassert or surreptitiously 
retrieve a master metanarrative of history. Further, by thematizing what I will call a politics of 
experience we will also attempt to move beyond the twin pitfalls of objectivism/voluntarism by 
taking an immanent approach—thereby also allowing us to skirt the trappings of leftist 
dogmatism, Heideggerian/authoritarian new ontology, and a manic hijacking of the object, 
epitomized by accelerationist thought, wherein subject and object are collapsed. A politics of 
experience, which we may also use to offset the seductions of Adorno’s Marxism (along with 
these other above thought-predilections) is no doubt an emphatically weak ‘politics,’ much in the 
sense in which Benjamin speaks of a “weak Messianic” power that the present holds in relation 
to past unredeemed suffering.67  
In the post-1914–1923 aftermath, Marxism as a sui generis form of politics loses its self-
evidence and hence cannot be claimed and inherited without undergoing immanent critique. In 
light of the eclipse of the political and its subsequent inversion and perversions, late-Marxism 
would come to assume the historical task of developing an eloquent politics of experience, one 
that places emphasis on critical experience if only so as to make possible emancipatory politics 
as such. Adorno’s writings, as I will attempt to demonstrate, are avowedly pre-political in the 
sense that they seek primarily to disclose a sedimentary experience of history and of what 
Benjamin calls Lehre (teaching, doctrine) by gestically preserving and disclosing in writing 
certain critical and to be sure recurrent aesthetic-artistic, psychological-sociological and 
philosophical-historical experiences (among other forms of experience). Adorno grasps this 
experiential manifold as transpiring under conditions of late-bourgeois society and capitalist 
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modernity, both of whose mutual historical contradictions68 mark a shared form of unfreedom 
and constraint: minimally, the unfolding of an immanent necessity. In a letter to Scholem, 
Benjamin would describe the particular freedom inherent in “education” as that of “tradition 
becoming visible and free.”69 
Addressing Horkheimer in a transcribed dialogue, Adorno expresses the pre-political 
dimension of their collaborative work in terms of its “pre-dialectical” character:  
what we are doing is pre-dialectical, a leaping out of the dialectic…Today…where 
everything is included and the world constitutes a unity as far as one can see, the idea of 
‘otherness’ is one whose time has come. We might almost say that the dialectic, which 
always contains an element of freedom, has come to a full stop today because nothing 
remains outside it. What Hegel and Marx called utopianism has been rendered obsolete 
by the present stage of history.70 
 
Even Adorno’s most ostensibly political works, essays and utterances—consider the 
above 1956 discussion with Horkheimer apropos a rewriting of Marx and Engels’ Communist 
Manifesto—are eminently pre-political in that they are primarily concerned with exploring 
present and past (minimal) conditions of im/possibility for both self-determining subjectivity (on 
an individual-monadic scale) and world-shaping praxis (on the level of collective praxis), both of 
which persist in the present as reified but in ruins, i.e., objective but alienated possibilities. As 
we have witnessed hitherto, such conditions of im/possibility are explored by Adorno by means 
of deploying critical concepts such as non-identity and by topically addressing enduring 
historically-sedimented antinomies that manifest themselves in both theory and praxis.  
The above ruins which are registered in Adorno’s corpus ensure his work’s continued 
relevance despite the common tendencies to dismiss his work and/or him ad hominem. History, 
in Hegel’s emphatic—if problematic—sense of the self-conscious unfolding of freedom, has yet 
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to liquidate Adorno’s work, which registers a persistent and shared narrative emplotment of 
unfreedom. Nor in any case has history qua freedom liquidated the works Adorno himself 
sustains, like those of Marx, as Adorno argued in his 1968 lecture “Is Marx Obsolete?” (to which 
he answered in the negative). In addition to holding open the theory/praxis antinomy, which 
stands as one of the defining and most productive aporias of Adorno’s corpus, Adorno’s 
continued relevance also rests upon his—like Benjamin’s—inheritance and reconfiguration of 
Kritik in the long aftermath of the collapse of German Idealism. Immanent critique inaugurated 
by Kant as, very broadly here, the exploration of conditions of possibility for experience and its 
transformation. 
For Adorno, the discontinuous histories of art, philosophy, literature, etc. produced under 
conditions of capitalist modernity, are catalogues of experiences by means of which the past, 
present and perhaps a post-capitalist future are re/determinable. History is recursive and under 
conditions of modernity there is, pace Derrida and Deleuze, no such thing as pure repetition but 
only repetition in its possible devolution (what Marx calls farce) or its potential recuperation and 
advancement. Such an advancement is expressed, for example, in Lenin’s identification of early 
20th century capitalist imperialism as the “highest state of capitalism,”71 in other words, the final 
stage of capitalism announced by self-determining revolutionary subjectivity. This deepening is 
expressed in praxis with the Bolshevik seizure of the state and in theory with Trotsky’s wager of 
“permanent revolution” and Lenin’s State and Revolution (1917), the latter a critical book-report 
on Marx and Engels’ scattered writings on the state. And yet potential recuperation, even if 
successful, can only entail further distancings and further slidings of experience into new unsure 
stages of crisis of both consciousness and social praxis. This was a problematic Trotsky 
registered in Lessons of October (1924), which retraces the crises of critical consciousness at 
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events and periods of historical and political rupture surrounding the Russian Revolutions of 
1917.  
The twin theoretical pitfalls Adorno navigates that are expressive of his cul-de-sac are 
that of, on the one hand, a melancholic decathexis (found, for instance, in an escapist retreat into 
the disinterested strongholds of theory and critique); and on the other hand, a manic hyper-
cathexis finding expression in an epistemological authoritarianism that results from hijacking the 
‘messages in a bottle’ (seen, for instance, in a praxis that subordinates theory to itself). Neither of 
these poles, of course, are completely avoidable, an acknowledgement that is expressed in 
Adorno’s antinomic thought-figure, “[t]he dialectical critic of culture must both participate in 
culture and not participate. Only then does he do justice to his object and to himself.”72 Adorno’s 
cathexis of natural-historical decline by way of self-comprehending and -memorializing criticism 
(what Pensky calls Adorno’s practice of “critical memory”) occasions the question of the 
relaxing of such cathexis, more precisely, of memorialization’s antithesis: forgetting, or more 
emphatically, active forgetting in Nietzsche’s sense.73  
It is this latter sense of forgetting which opens up rapt historical memorialization to its 
antithesis, praxis.74 Adorno singled out such a categorical hairpin turn as Benjamin’s proper 
“bequest”: “to bring the intentionless within the realm of concepts: the obligation to think at the 
same time dialectically and undialectically.”75 In “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” 
Nietzsche conceives of forgetting as an activity that can be in the service of life, and which can 
thus be supra- or post-historical insofar as historical forgetting (e.g., collective praxis) can 
overcome a form of remembering or cathexis of the past. To actively forget in Nietzsche’s sense 
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holds out the possibility for not only overcoming a need to remember but also overcoming the 
past itself, the latter understood as a manifold of unresolved problems that weigh upon the 
present.  
 
VIII. Turn to Historicism 
The name of history may not be spoken since what would truly be history, the Other, has 
not yet begun.—Adorno76 
 
Indexing the retreat into critique and autonomous theory, the late-Marxian go-for-broke 
turn to critical historiography reaches a fever pitch in Benjamin’s hermetic meditations in “On 
the Concept of History” (1940).77 This turn Benjamin instigates is affirmed by Adorno’s further 
recoiling response, “Reflections on Class Theory” (1942), as well as one of Horkheimer’s more 
radical works, “The Authoritarian State” (1940), both written in response to Benjamin’s above 
(and perhaps final) work and premature death.78 To be sure, these three essays represent Critical 
Theory’s moment of absolute recoil, the latter two of which cannot be understood exclusively on 
the basis of the historically proximate traumas of Benjamin’s suicide and Hitler’s enunciation of 
the final solution. Indeed, in “Reflections on Class Theory” we encounter Adorno writing in the 
language of a Marxism in extremis and under-erasure: 
According to [Marxian] theory,79 history is the history of class struggles. But the concept 
of class is bound up with the emergence of the proletariat. Even when it was still 
revolutionary, the bourgeoise called itself the third estate. By extending the concept of 
class to prehistory, theory denounces not just the bourgeoise, whose freedom, together 
with their possessions and education, perpetuates the tradition of the old injustice. It also 
turns against prehistory itself. 
 
By exposing the historical necessity that had brought capitalism into being, [bourgeois] 
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political economy became the critique of history as a whole…All history is the history of 
class struggles because it was always the same thing, namely, prehistory. This gives us a 
pointer as to how we can recognize what history is. From the most recent form of 
injustice, a steady light reflects back on history as a whole. Only in this way can theory 
enable us to use the full weight of history to gain an insight into the present without 
succumbing in resignation to the burden of the past. 
 
The irreconcilable power of the negative that sets history in motion is the power of what 
exploiters do to the victims. As a shackle binding one generation to the next, it functions 
as an obstacle to both freedom and history. The systematic unity of history [found in 
“Marxism” “as a philosophy”], which is supposed to give meaning to individual suffering 
or else demote it from on high to the level of something fortuitous, is the philosophical 
appropriation of the labyrinth in which men have toiled to this day, the epitome of 
suffering.80 
 
In turning to historical critique, Adorno elucidates the origins and conditions of 
possibility for the irreversible break Marx’s work instigated. Chief among these origins were the 
“bourgeois upheavals” to which, however, “the bourgeois was unable to find a successor” when 
bourgeois society, under conditions of capitalist modernity, came into self-contradiction.81 In 
Marx’s hands, the proletariat was thus simultaneously a historically concrete (sociological) and 
speculative category. As Adorno explicates above, Marx’s breakthrough was also achieved 
through an immanent critique of bourgeois political economy which came into self-contradiction 
as well. Marx’s corpus and subsequently Marxism as a politics were predicated on the 
condemnation of history—including the history of capitalist society hitherto—as prehistory, 
insofar as it took part in the unfolding of an immanent necessity.82  
These three above works by Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer index their shared 
impulse to retreat into ‘critique’ (the exploration of conditions of im/possibility for change), and 
more specifically, historically-insulated critique, when robust forms of self-constituting 
subjectivity and collective praxis are at a standstill, or worse, regressing—on account of 
                                                   
80 Ibid., 95. 
81 Horkheimer, “Authoritarian State,” 106; Adorno, COL, 227. 
82 See Ibid., 97, where Horkheimer echoes Adorno’s above reflections. 
  32 
pernicious counter-revolutionary social forces and the psychic internalization of defeat. Indeed, 
as Horkheimer and then Adorno forcefully argue in these works: 
Sociological and psychological concepts are too superficial to express what has happened 
to revolutionaries in the last few decades: their will toward freedom has been damaged, 
without which neither understanding nor solidarity nor a correct relation between leader 
and group is conceivable.83  
 
The immeasurable pressure of domination has so fragmented the masses that it has even 
dissipated the negative unity of being oppressed that forged them into a class in the 
nineteenth century. In exchange, they find they have been directly absorbed into the unity 
of the system that is oppressing them. Class rule is set to survive the anonymous, 
objective form of the class.84 
 
Through their synchronous turns to historical critique these thinkers reveal, however 
negatively, that an implicit historical self-understanding (Selbst-Darstellung) was the condition 
of possibility for emancipatory social praxis as it had come to be known historically, leading up 
to the aftermath of WWI and the failure of socialist world revolution issuing from the October 
Revolution and elsewhere. Registering the decline and eclipse of such self-presentation, these 
works overcompensate for this waning by enacting that which is dwindling. Horkheimer, in 
particular, oscillates between utter despair—“whoever cares for a human arrangement of the 
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world can look to no court of appeal, to existing or future power”—and self-determined hope.85 
In the following passage he ends with what could be construed as a hopeless plea: 
The revolution that ends domination is as far-reaching as the will of the liberated. Any 
resignation is already a regression into prehistory…The theoretical conception which, 
following its first trailblazers, will show the new society its way—the system of worker’s 
councils—grows out of praxis. The roots of the council system go back to 1871, 1905, 
and other events. Revolutionary transformation has a tradition that must continue.”86 
What was implicitly operative in praxis has to be recovered immanently, and 
nonsynchronistically, by way of a dialectic of retrieval whereby the critique of contemporary 
forms of antinomic appearance are animated by the presentation of their historical sedimentation. 
In light of such natural-historical decay that can be registered on levels both sociological and 
psychological, it would appear that the memory of both Marxism and the struggle for socialism 
can only be accessed through a critical experience of tradition—a brush with history that both 
theory and art are capable of offering. As Horkheimer puts the matter to Adorno in their 1956 
dialogue, “we cannot rely on the assumption that people will still have any memories of 
socialism.”87 Adorno’s work, in particular, stands as a cipher for understanding what it might 
mean to say that the struggle for socialism has been relinquished. Such an understanding is made 
possible through his general thesis of the regression of consciousness, which explicates how 
consciousness can adapt, conform and even fall beneath a regressive social totality.88 Engaged 
retrospectively from the present, Adorno’s corpus compels us to retrace these faltering steps of 
regression.  
What we are calling late-Marxism is a decathected Marxism and hence no longer an 
emphatic Marxism operating on the levels of theory and praxis (as is found in Lenin and 
                                                   
85 Horkehimer, “Authoritarian State,” 104. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Adorno & Horkheimer, “Towards a New Manifesto?” 43. 
88 See Adorno, CM, 292. 
  34 
Luxemburg); instead, late-Marxism constitutes a dialectical image of what Marxism was. (This, 
however, is not to say Adorno was not a Marxist in a strong sense.) The above retreat into 
critique effectuates the becoming-writing and -aesthetic of late-Marxism: on the level of the text 
itself, and in its turn to problems surrounding aesthetics, more precisely, the relation between 
politics and aesthetics.89 The two-fold becoming-aesthetic of late-Marxism thus indexes, more 
generally, the retreat of world-shaping praxis (prefigured in Lenin and Luxemburg’s final 
reflections that similarly turn away from concrete politics and toward a politics of experience); 
and more distantly, the pernicious counter-revolutions whose preponderance led to the 
internalization of defeat (seen most conspicuously in the pervasive introjection of Stalinism), the 
latter a problematic dialectically registered in Wilheim Reich’s discourse on “the fear of 
freedom,” and echoed in Frantz Fanon’s discourse on the “pathology of freedom.”90  
For late-Marxism these historico-political crises occasion enduring historico-
philosophical problematics that serve to hold open the wounds of their imminent enclosures; for 
instance, Lukács on reification; Korsch on philosophy and Marxism; Benjamin on the 
philosophy of history; and Adorno on the non-identity of theory and praxis. Adorno will 
simultaneously address all of these concerns in a single train of thought from his Lectures on 
Negative Dialectics: “The separation of theory and praxis is itself an expression of reified 
consciousness. And it is the task of philosophy to dismantle the rigidity, the dogmatic and 
irreconcilable character of this separation.”91 The textual-literary effects that these problematics 
effectuate include most notably the becoming-sedimented and -hermetic of the text; in other 
words, the introduction of tarrying into late-Marxism.  
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IX. Conclusion 
Late-Marxism’s broad turn to matters of aesthetics—culminating in Adorno’s 
asystematic critique of the history of (late-)modern art in Aesthetic Theory—became the 
necessary if conditional theatre in which to carry out the program of a politics of experience by 
means of mobilizing the messages in bottles that find their grounding in critical historical 
experience. To be sure, this is a program seeking ultimately to foster self-constituting subjects 
and collective self-determining praxis democratically embodying and struggling in the direction 
of a post-capitalist social arrangement. The politics of experience operative in the works of these 
figures thus stands as not only a placeholder of sorts for emancipatory politics; as pre-political, it 
also serves as a tendential umbilical cord to emancipatory politics, while simultaneously 
exposing the latter’s im/possibility. Hence to speak of such a pre-politics is simply to strive to 
make exoteric and democratically available a critical experience of history (which we have 
begun to explicate) that Benjamin and Adorno collectively assumed and in some sense took for 
granted—an experience which is otherwise intimate and esoteric (as seen in their letter 
correspondence). To be sure, their shared experience of the present “traverses life with the speed 
of lightning,” reaching nimbly (if helplessly) back into the past to comprehend the now-time, but 
never out of injury for the present in its singularity and availability to spontaneity and futural 
plasticity.92 Their combined works can be read today as supercondensing the history and critical 
experience of capitalist modernity into a calculus of citable gestures, which intermingle in a 
differentiated chorus.  
It is here that Susan Buck-Morss’ remark—to paraphrase, that artists have more 
interestingly engaged Benjamin’s work than philosophers and academics—becomes of crucial 
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importance.93 One would have to look no farther than a filmmaker such as Chris Marker or the 
late work of Jean-Luc Godard to corroborate Buck-Morss’ judgment that, historically, artists 
have exhibited a more compelling disclosive capacity for a Benjaminian-Adornian politics of 
experience than that of ‘discourse’ (e.g., contemporary philosophy, theory, art criticism, etc.).94  
Immanent to the idea of such a Benjaminian-Adornian pre-politics are its concepts of form, 
presentation and disclosure which serve to produce in language a critical experience of history in 
both its freedom and (hypostatized) unfreedom. Herein lies, we should note, the proximity of 
Benjamin and Adorno’s thought to the knowledge of (modern) literature, which is closer, we 
might venture, to experience than discourse and theory by way of its immanence to experience 
and the forms of life.  
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2. Reading Adorno’s Interdisciplinary Dialectical Criticism  
 
…certain illegible traces, like chalk dust on 
a blackboard after it has been erased, so we 
must learn to recognize it as the form—the 
only one—in which such fragments of the 
true learning as we are destined to receive 
will be vouchsafed to us, if at all. 
       —John Ashbery95 
 
 
 
 
I. Approaching Adorno 
Receiving Adorno’s messages in a bottle requires us to decathect ‘what’ Adorno sought 
to digest (history, broadly speaking) from his thought proper and ask speculatively how this 
process of (put crudely) digesting experience might be of pertinence given the needs of the 
present (as we will explore in chapter 4). In taking up Adorno’s work, we find ourselves 
compelled to divest it of its congealed and thereby quasi-non-negotiable character which results 
from his dialectical dissensus vis-à-vis the object of critique, which is preponderantly 
historically-sedimented. The end of such decathexis, the goal of relaxing Adorno’s grip, will be 
to open up availability to what is otherwise tendentially muted when strictly approaching his 
criticism in its (pre)cathected character. This overdetermined cathexis manifests itself perhaps 
most conspicuously in Adorno’s quasi-authoritarian (if aporetic) formulations, such as “[i]t is 
self-evident that nothing concerning art is self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation 
to the world, not even its right to exist”; or his controversial proscriptions concerning writing 
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‘poetry’ after Auschwitz.96 Yet Adorno often acknowledges this congealed dimension of work, 
such as when he remarks how “[t]he prohibitions [dictated by his philosophical criticism] are 
both gentle and strict.”97 Loosening Adorno’s grip thus means engaging his work via the critical 
model of allegory so as to decouple historical experience and philosophical reflection.  
To thematize the unpleasant—indeed perhaps for some, insufferable—tarrying operative 
in his work, which stems from a deeper, intransigent submission to history, is to highlight the 
rapt cathexis immanent to his writing that results from the work of criticism. Take, for example, 
the opening lines of Adorno’s 1965 radio talk “Sexual Taboos and Law Today” which are 
expressly indicative of the weighty character of his writing and thought: 
The theorist who intervenes in practical controversies nowadays discovers on a regular 
basis and to his shame that whatever ideas he might contribute were expressed long ago 
—and usually better the first time around. This means that time-honored arguments must 
once again be trotted out.98 
 
To be sure, it would be typical and even stereotypical to read this passage as sententious 
and condescending,99 when in fact it might also represent the humility (deference to past critical 
figures) and submissiveness (immanence to tradition and history) of Adorno’s thought. Isolating 
such tarrying further enables us to highlight—and thereby prevents us from fetishizing—‘what’ 
is being tarried-with (the historically-sedimented object, subjectively yet allegorically cathected), 
preventing us, moreover, from reifying the thought. To do so is to open up and return thought to 
the stream of becoming whence it emergences as a maelstrom (Benjamin) or whirlpool 
(Schelling). Yet upon decathecting Adorno’s work we find that his thought is itself already 
immanently allegorical (and therefore not symbolic, to invoke Benjamin’s distinction) in that it 
reflexively remarks upon its own historically and thus singularly determinate cathexis.  
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As Shierry Weber Nicholsen has pointed out,100 the desire to simply ‘better understand’ 
Adorno tends to only mean over-academicizing his work (i.e., making the task of inheriting his 
corpus a matter of strict hermeneutics) and thereby prevents us from critically reckoning with 
what is at stake in his corpus. Guarding against the pitfalls of the entrenched academic practices 
surrounding Adorno (which reduce his work, for instance, to simply a critique of late-capitalist 
society, instrumental rationality, etc.), immanently approaching his work by posing Adorno’s 
question of messages in a bottle—and not having a preordained regulative hermeneutics ready-
at-hand (e.g., Marxism)—forces us to imaginatively and speculatively engage his work. (With 
regard to these former academic practices, it should be noted that a strictly scholarly or text-
based study of, say, the origins of negative dialectics might operate entirely immanently, that is, 
strictly on the level of discursivity—and thereby miss the extra-textual and -discursive messages 
in a bottle. To be sure, it is a danger inherent to archaeologically-driven work that what is extra-
discursive might be repressed and hence not be adequately acknowledged as intimately 
constitutive of discourse proper.) However, when engaging Adorno’s work speculatively, we 
quickly encounter that his work is itself already speculative and thereby extra-empirical—yet 
only by way of immanent dialectical critique. To glimpse the speculative-spiritual moment of 
Adorno’s thinking, which is grounded in the empirical-experiential, we need only recall the 
opening lines of his important work of pedagogy, “Education after Auschwitz.” 
Adorno begins this essay with the assertion that “the premier demand upon all education 
is that Auschwitz not happen again,” a plea for which he does not believe he needs to adduce 
supporting evidence, as scientific discourse might put it.101 He writes: “Its priority before any 
other requirement is such that I believe I need not and should not justify it. To justify it would be 
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monstrous in the face of the monstrosity that took place.”102 In the spirit of Adorno, we also need 
to be willing to sacrifice certain scientific and discursive requirements in order to conduct 
unconditional interdisciplinary research and writing, and to make larger claims that adequately 
respond to the enormity of events and phenomena with which cultural criticism is tasked with 
reckoning—yet that all the while remain immanent to the object of critique.   
To engage Adorno’s disseminated messages immanently, and so not be “above” them (as 
Adorno cautioned against when approaching the work of Hegel), is comparable to asking what 
the present is “in the face of” Adorno.103 Indeed, anything less risks not only mistaking the 
re/search of origin (Ursprung) as an end in itself, but also failing to acknowledge the ‘new’ that 
is both anterior and immanent to origin, which gives rise to the impulse and consequent research 
of origin in the first place. To mistake origin for the goal would mean, for example, failing to 
grasp the political and historical emplotments within which Adorno’s Negative Dialectics or 
Benjamin’s Arcades Project were undertaken and operate, and the past, present and futural 
modalities the works open out onto.  
For all of Adorno’s emphasis on maintaining not only the primacy of the object but also 
sustaining (and so not collapsing) the contradictions that fissure the object—in short, his critical 
object-dependence—it is easy to forget that his criticism also sought to make itself obsolescent. 
Counterbalancing his natural-historical criticism, this latter intention highlights Adorno’s 
allegiance to a Hegelian-Marxism that strives to sublate philosophy into a broader economy. The 
gesture of grasping what is unsublatable in the object and, through the work of criticism, 
pointing to its possible (self-)overcoming is the dialectical dimension of Adorno’s thought, and 
expresses in miniature the potential of philosophy to abolish itself through historical self-
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liquidation. That Adorno can still be of historical interest to us and have a certain purchase on the 
present indicates that his work is not yet exhausted or obsolete, and moreover, that we continue 
to share with him, as well as Marx, the ‘this-sidedness’ of theory, which always finds itself 
outstretched—yearning to find its terminus and liquidation in and through praxis. Indeed, the 
continued purchase of Adorno’s work may be generally understood to be a function of its 
immanent relation to both history and to what has transpired since Adorno’s death, i.e., his 
work’s unforeseeable post-history. Beyond the obvious difficulties of receiving his work in the 
Anglo-American context, Nicholsen has keenly given voice to a shared sense of “the presence of 
some fundamental problem in grasping [Adorno’s] work that we have yet to overcome.”104 “One 
senses,” she continues, “that we have still not plumbed the real implications of the work. It is 
almost as though the sense of familiarity masks an inaccessible core of the work that has so far 
proved impervious to appropriation.”105  Following Nicholsen, this hermeneutical problem can be 
overcome, she argues, by “imaginatively appropriating his work.”106 For our purposes here, this 
means approaching Adorno’s work compositionally, which will be achieved by creating “a 
mosaic,” as Nicholsen writes, “in which diverse elements from his life and work are 
juxtaposed.”107 
 
*** 
 
II. Interlude: Theory & Praxis, An Origin Story 
 
In the interest of further exploring the dissensual relation between theory and praxis that 
obtains in Adorno’s corpus, it will be productive to broach his early formative relation to the 
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eminent Viennese composer Alban Berg (1885–1935) of the Second Viennese School. As 
evidenced by his various biographies, Adorno’s tutelage under Berg constitutes one of the many 
primal scenes of his oeuvre.108 Adorno first met Berg when the latter came to Frankfurt in the 
spring of 1924 “for a premiere performance of fragments from his opera Wozzeck, conducted by 
Hermann Scherchen.”109 Adorno was in the audience, and “[o]vercome by the music,” he 
recounts that he “begged Scherchen, with whom I had contact, to introduce me to Berg. In a few 
minutes it was agreed that I should come to Vienna as his student.”110  
In terms of Adorno’s own overarching aesthetic theory, which draws heavily from the 
various disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, it goes without saying that in order for 
there to be robust artistic production, creativity and praxis, there must also be certain auspicious 
psychic and social conditions in place. Faced with the decision of whether to pursue the career of 
a composer during his time with Berg, Adorno’s forsaking of this path entailed his own personal-
occupational displacement from praxis, a self-distancing that constitutes an internal tension in his 
own work and which only complicates his inheritance of the fraught Marxian relation between 
theory and praxis. Adorno’s early relation to Berg consequently sets the tone for his ensuing 
corpus not as simply a biographical, Kierkegaardian either/or (composer/scholar) but more 
crucially, as a problematic immanent to his thought and the peculiar physiognomy of his work.  
Adorno’s drive to conceptualize and comprehend, which he harnessed through the 
medium of writing in his emphatically modernist, self-revolutionizing life-work, posed serious 
problems for his ability to commit wholly to artistic praxis, that is, to become a composer. The 
following humorous anecdote offered by Susan Buck-Morss (who has gone perhaps farthest in 
apprehending Adorno’s work compositionally) evidences this near neurotic drive of Adorno’s:  
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Whenever there was an opportunity, Adorno accompanied Berg and his wife to concerts 
and, of course, to the opera. On one occasion, they heard Mahler’s Eighth Symphony 
conducted by Anton von Webern. They became so excited about the music that they 
talked too loudly and ‘were almost thrown out for rowdiness.’111  
 
Adorno’s compulsive drive to conceptualize—here, the impulse to discuss and 
comprehend musical praxis—was only later met with enthusiasm by Berg whereas with 
Schoenberg, infamously, it never made sense. At first, as Buck-Morss explains, “Berg did not 
much appreciate Adorno’s ‘philosophical ballast,’ which he referred to as ‘fad.’”112  
Having “serious aspirations to become a composer,” Buck-Morss so writes of Adorno, 
we can imagine he could indeed have become a professional composer and/or musician.113 Yet 
Buck-Morss notes how he “was not [musically] prolific” and “had little success in getting his 
music performed”; and as Stefan Müller-Doohm has detailed, this was largely due to the 
immense amount of time he devoted to writing music criticism and philosophy.114 Ultimately, 
Buck-Morss explains, Adorno “returned to Frankfurt after little more than a year [of studying 
under Berg] in order to resume his study of philosophy with the hope of obtaining a university 
teaching position. The reasons for his leaving Vienna are unclear.”115 But as Buck-Morss reliably 
speculates, “Adorno was perhaps too reflective, too self-conscious, and lacked the spontaneity 
necessary for uninhibited composing. He may have realized that, given his penchant for 
philosophy, he was better suited to musical criticism than composition.”116 Adorno’s concern 
with composition, however, would nevertheless persist and survive in the critical work he 
produced throughout his life—his writings relating to history allegorically in a manner 
comparable to that of music. As such, we are compelled to engage Adorno not simply in terms of 
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strict argument, but we must also attempt to play his ideas and thought—as Adorno wrote 
apropos Hegel—“with the speculative ear as though they were musical notes.”117 
 
*** 
 
 
III. Experience and Criticism 
 
The enduring purchase of Adorno’s work lies in his straightforward project of 
philosophically digesting critical experience, by means of which experience and philosophical 
reflection are nevertheless maintained as non-identical.118 In his “Dialectical Epilegomena” to 
Negative Dialectics, comprising his late works “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis” and “On 
Subject and Object,” Adorno would remark that these essays brought “together, intentionally, 
philosophical speculation and drastic experience.”119 Such a constituitive non-identity of 
philosophical criticism and aesthetic experience became a necessity in modernity, a need Hegel 
classically addressed in his Aesthetics.120 In his early essay “The Social Situation of Music” 
(1932), Adorno assumed this post-Hegelian problematic in analogizing the task of “present-day 
music” (and modern art, more broadly) to that of critical “social theory,” arguing that they share 
the same “aporias” and, moreover, are both “under the same obligation” to fufill their respective 
“dialectical cognitive function[s],” that is, to occasion critical acknowledgement.121 Buck-Morss 
lends clarity to the post-Hegelian problematic that Adorno inherits when she succinctly defines 
the interlinking tasks of modern art and criticism: “[Artists’] work is to sustain the critical 
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moment of aesthetic experience; our job as critics is to recognize this.”122 The circuit Adorno 
thus establishes between art and critique, between experience and philosophical reflection, often 
leads him—as he was fond of doing, for instance, apropos a Brecht or a Beckett—to place an 
artist’s own self-understanding (of their art) against their art as such. As Lydia Goehr will put 
this matter in the context of the philosophy of music, “it is not uncommon to hear a tension 
existing between what musicians claim they want to do with music and what they actually do.”123 
Accordingly, this parallax serves to inform and guide our own reading of Adorno. 
Perhaps one cannot fully grasp the stakes of philosophical reflection and criticism unless 
one has explored the rich context—in short, experience—whence a form of thought has emerged. 
Such conditioning biographical and historical factors, which call to be held in constellation with 
the substantive content of philosophical activity, negatively delineate, for our purposes here, the 
equiprimordial-constitutive blindnesses and insights of Adorno himself as well as his work and 
corpus proper. Consequently, an account of the origins of negative dialectics must look equally 
to exogenous historical experience as well as the immanent stream of discursivity and tradition.  
For W.E.B. Du Bois124 as for Adorno, the origins of a negative dialectics, that is, a 
Hegelian dialectics sans reconciliation, arise from the distinctly modern experience of unfreedom 
in the failed attempt of struggling to overcome one’s own individual, collective and world-
historical entanglement under conditions of global capitalism. In Adorno’s case, as well as Du 
Bois’, such a transmutation of dialectics is born of both an immanent critique of Hegel as well 
                                                   
122 Buck-Morss, “Response to Visual Culture Questionnaire,” 29. 
123 Goehr, Imaginary Museum of Musical Works, 261. 
124 In addition to standing as a historical document of the struggle of African-Americans for social emancipation and 
redemption, Du Bois’ Souls of Black Folk (1903) also represents an immanent critique of Hegelian dialectics. 
“Double consciousness”—Du Bois’ term that indexes the awareness of African-Americans of being simultaneously 
Americans and not Americans—became a fundamental idea of African-American literature and criticism, as seen in 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man and Richard Wright’s “The Man Who Lived Underground”—two classic works by 
black Americans that explore Du Bois’ theme through writing social invisibility and the struggle for self-constituting 
identity. The idea would also be taken up in post-colonial thought, as seen in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks. 
  46 
one’s own proper historical experience. As Adorno would explicate in “Reflections on Class 
Theory,” 
Dynamism is merely one side of dialectic: it is the side preferred by the belief in 
practicality, masterful action, the indefatigable ‘can-do’ attitude, because constant change 
is the best way to conceal the old untruth. The other, less popular aspect of dialectic is its 
static side. The self-movement of the concept, the conception of history as a syllogism, as 
it is to be found in Hegel’s philosophy, is no developmental doctrine. It was only turned 
into one by the collusive misunderstanding of the humanities. The law that, according to 
the Hegelian dialectic, governs the restlessly destructive unfolding of the ever-new is also 
the old lying close at hand. The new does not add itself to the old but remains the old in 
distress, in its hours of need, as it becomes topical as an immanent contradiction through 
its act of reflection, its indispensable confrontation with the universal in the old. Thus 
throughout all its antithetical mediations, history remains one vast analytic proposition.125 
 
 In Adorno’s work, as exemplified in this passage, critique strives to establish a 
continuous circuit between the post-Kantian concepts of freedom and the concepts of nature 
(unfreedom), and more broadly, between discursivity and historical experience proper. Through 
such capacious mediation, Adorno’s model of critique overcomes a central problem internal to 
Kant’s philosophy—what Kant himself called “the great chasm”—as well as its Neo-Kantian 
recrudescence, the latter which followed the waning presence of Hegelian philosophy in Western 
Europe in the late 19th century and became “the dominant pre-World War One philosophy.”126 
Adorno would follow Benjamin’s early 1918 metacritique of Kant and the pervasive Neo-
Kantianism of his day, where Benjamin offered one of his first articulations of the idea of a 
‘dialectics without synthesis’ (or constellation), which sought to tenuously mediate between the 
post-Kantian spheres of reason (freedom) and nature/experience (unfreedom). Through such a 
short-circuiting of mediative integration (synthesis), Benjamin broadened the philosophical space 
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(traditionally conceived as the aesthetic—from Kant on) between these two traditionally distinct 
and antithetical spheres—a philosophical gesture Adorno would embrace and further develop. 
For Benjamin, and Adorno following him, the aesthetic sphere may be thought of as a mosaic or 
chorus of ideas.  
The contemporary appropriation of Adorno by Jacques Rancière has done much to turn 
attention away from, or at least color our perception of, Adorno on the basis of Rancière’s  
argument that Adorno’s work—specifically his aesthetics—is detached and aloof from 
experience. In Aesthetics and Its Discontents (2009), Rancière characterizes Adorno’s aesthetics 
as “maintaining the gap between the dissensual form of the work [of art] and the forms of 
ordinary experience.”127 In short, Adorno’s aesthetics are here perceived as being predicated on a 
“refusal” of the “mundane world” through his critical affirmation of the non-identical dimension 
of modern art.128 Rancière will use the following line of Adorno’s to sum up his aesthetics: “The 
social function of Art…is to not have one.”129 While Rancière here captures a fundamental 
dimension of Adorno’s aesthetics, his engagement with Adorno nevertheless reduces his work to 
a monolithic aesthetic theory, and thereby abstracts his thought from the historical experience 
whence it was formed and gains intelligibility. 
To broadly argue that Adorno’s work stands above or against ordinary experience risks 
neglecting the central role the concept of experience plays in Adorno’s overall living-thought. As 
we have studied, Adorno maintained experience to be both non-identical to philosophical 
criticism but also intimately constitutive of the latter. Moreover, Adorno’s broad and sustained 
turn to aesthetics and the criticism of modern art was itself undertaken in response to more 
general-historical circumstances which presented themselves to Adorno’s own proper 
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experience—an experience we have sought to capture hitherto. Rancière further writes that for 
Adorno, “[t]he promise [of a reconciled society] is negatively preserved [in the work of art], not 
only through the separation between artistic form and other forms of life, but also through the 
inner contradiction of this form itself.”130 Thus Rancière concludes that for Adorno, “aesthetic 
difference,” i.e., autonomous art’s non-identity to social reality, becomes the “guardian of the 
promise.”131 While Adorno doubtless prizes autonomous artworks that are non-identical to social 
reality whence semblances of hope flash up like “fireworks,” he did not require the artwork, or 
art more generally, to singlehandedly or didactically pave the way for social redemption, as 
Rancière intimates here.132 Rather, Adorno understood the task of bringing about a reconciled 
society as proper to collective praxis as informed by critical social theory, and vice versa; 
modern art—the plenipotentiary of a freedom yet realized—cannot bring about thoroughgoing 
social freedom alone. 
 
IV. Reading Adorno (with Benjamin) 
Adorno comes to us as not only predigested in his being remote, that is, irrelevant, to our 
contemporary moment (such a lack of presence is detectable in his form of writing, specifically 
in his mode of address); but we also receive him as brought to a finish, as it were: as myth has it, 
the German New Left and their “flower power” quite literally killed him.133 The predigested and 
predetermined character of our reception of Adorno thus compels us—as we have undertaken 
heretofore—to work our way back into his thought by engaging it immanently. Adorno’s final 
works—in particular, his criticisms of the German New Left (the SDS, Marcuse, etc.) and his 
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unfinished monograph Aesthetic Theory—represent further retreats into both the strongholds of 
theory (in the face of false/bad praxis) and the history of art, respectively. Such retreats bring 
about a sense of closure for Adorno (and for first generation Critical Theory more broadly), but 
not resignation, as he would stress in his final published essay “Resignation.” Indeed, Adorno’s 
avowed identification with theory was hedged and strategic: “The desperate state of affairs, that 
the praxis on which everything depends is thwarted,” he argues, “paradoxically affords thinking 
the breathing-space which it would practically be criminal not to use.”134 Such an identification 
with theory (over and against praxis), which subtends the entirety of Adorno’s corpus—despite 
the fact that much of his work thematizes artistic praxis—is not comparable, again, to the 
Heideggerian or post-Heideggerian turns to thinking, which were undertaken for different 
motives that we do not have space to explore here.  
From his early work to his late work, Adorno will often remark upon the this-sidedness 
and insufficiency of criticism and theory: 
[…] criticism cannot take comfort in its own idea.      
Dialectic reaches the insight that the closed process also includes the non-included. It 
thus reaches a boundary to knowledge itself. Dialectical theory itself would only be 
surpassed by transforming praxis. 
  
The interpretation of given reality and its abolition are connected to each other, not, of 
course, in the sense that reality is negated in the concept, but that out of the construction 
of a configuration of reality the demand for [reality’s] real change always follows 
promptly. The change-causing gesture of the riddle process—not its mere resolution as 
such—provides the image of resolutions to which materialist praxis alone has access… 
mere thought by itself cannot accomplish this: therefore the annihilation of the question 
compels praxis.135 
 
As these passages evidence, the avowed this-sidedness of theory becomes the pivot from 
which Adorno’s work opens onto that which exceeds it. The twin status of ‘theory’ as a 
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delimited field and ‘praxis’ as a limit-concept of alterity in Adorno’s corpus comes into high 
relief in his late work (e.g., “Resignation,” “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” etc. (1969)), 
much of which was informed by his complex critical engagement with the German New Left. 
Even though the German New Left later dismissed him, Adorno’s works and pedagogy upon his 
return to post-WWII West Germany were both profoundly instrumental in bringing the former to 
the world-historical stage. Thus while business-as-usual for Adorno is immanent dialectical 
criticism, in the moments where his work remarks upon itself (as theory or criticism, for 
instance), his corpus opens onto more general-historical trajectories that transpire behind the 
back of the manifest content of his writings: for our interests here, the trajectory he terms 
“historical praxis.”136 In light of this dual nature of Adorno’s writing (latent/manifest), it seems 
vital to attempt to futher unravel and explore his ambivalences, in other words, to continue 
mining the enigmatic and cryptic character of both Adorno as a figure and his difficult corpus.  
 Recent research that has brought the works of Benjamin and Adorno together has 
revealed the double enunciation (or what Jean-Luc Nancy would call “compearance”) of 
Benjamin with(in) Adorno.137 Indeed more broadly, engaging both thinkers simultaneously can 
serve as a gateway to clarifying the proper contents and physiognomies of each of their 
challenging life-works. Adorno, for one, anticipated how his work was and could increasingly 
become potentially obscure and esoteric, and so strove to counteract this tendency. While 
Benjamin’s corpus is arguably more gnomic and rarified than the former’s (and thus more apt to 
be freely interpreted and abused), Adorno’s work—while also cryptic in its own right—is able 
nevertheless to remark more explicitly upon its own potential obscurity and difficulty on account 
of a palpable presence of Adorno as critic and Adorno as author in much of his work.  
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The difference in authorial presence between the two writers is not coincidental but 
points to the discorrespondence of their methods, their respective historical experiences and their 
differing understandings of critique. With regard to the last, Benjamin is primarily interested in 
immanent critique whereas Adorno tends to engage simultaneously in both transcendent critique 
(“aims at totality”/“call[s] culture as a whole into question from outside”) and immanent critique 
(“presupposes the questionable whole” and “confront[s] [culture] with the norms it itself has 
crystallized”).138  
Seldom in Benjamin’s work—his letter correspondences aside—does he openly or 
confessionally “put his cards on the table” (Adorno, Negative Dialectics), that is, to explicitly 
unfold his philosophical methodology, or unequivocally claim, for instance, to “submit 
himself…to the authority of the materialist dialectic” (Adorno, “The Idea of Natural History”).139  
Benjamin as author tends to be phenomenologically hidden from his corpus; and this, we can 
glean, was of methodological interest to Benjamin, whose styles of citation, montage and 
presentation seek to give birth to the critical reader. In his eulogistic “Portrait of Walter 
Benjamin,” Adorno spoke to the general opacity and invisibility of Benjamin, in terms of both 
his personal character and temperament and also in terms of his status as ‘author’ of the work 
and research he produced during his life. This is not the least reason why the vast letter 
correspondence between Benjamin and his various interlocutors seems essential when not only 
looking for the author ‘behind’ the mercurial and fragmentary corpus Benjamin bequeathed but 
also when attempting to achieve an exhaustive and unconditional reading of Benjamin that tends 
toward systematic comprehension.140 It is in light of these hermeneutical difficulties that both the 
practice and study of letter writing becomes, as Stefan Müller-Doohm puts it, “an aid to 
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philosophical self-clarification”—for both ourselves and the writers we are striving to 
understand.141 
The difference in vocal presence of both thinkers does not betray the above textual 
typologies. For instance, Benjamin’s radio talks present yet another ‘new’ Benjamin no one has 
heard before, whereas the transcripts of Adorno’s radio talks—as well as his recorded 
discussions with Horkheimer (which Gretel Adorno painstakingly transcribed along with many 
other Adorno-dictated manuscripts, as the men carried on as usual142)—only make what is unsaid 
and latent in Adorno’s texts become more legible. In speech, Adorno is more forthright and less 
authorially evasive: “We have to express ourselves in such a way that our readers can see quite 
clearly how things have to be changed, but one must allow the reader to see enough to enable 
him to glimpse the idea that change is possible.”143 Upon the publication of the English 
translation of Adorno’s Critical Models, containing many of his radio talks, the book was praised 
as “a more accessible Adorno to the public.”144 By contrast, speaking Benjamin in the recently 
published Radio Benjamin (2014) is still mercurial as ever.  
Adorno is forced to shore up the protean character of Benjamin’s thinking in order to— 
however ambivalently—preserve him and integrate his work into his own comparatively more 
programmatic thinking. While Adorno’s appropriation and reconfiguration of Benjamin’s 
method of immanent criticism (developed in the latter’s 1924 study of Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities and the Trauerspiel) is an act of self-comprehension apropos Benjamin, this endeavor 
doubtless sacrifices the unboundedness of Benjamin’s thought. (This is revealed, for instance, in 
the way in which praxis-bound anarchist thought is less amenable to Adorno’s avowedly Marxist 
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thinking than it is to Benjamin’s thought, the latter who never firmly settled on any hermeneutic 
keys.) Indeed, by extracting a method out of his thought, Adorno’s transmutation of Benjamin 
may be lamented as an ossifying of Benjamin’s protean thought into the comparatively more 
systematic thrust of Critical Theory.145 Yet on the other hand, Benjamin’s thought may be seen 
as only becoming strategic when framed by Adorno’s transcendental elevation of the former’s 
practice into a method. Nevertheless, it is only by finding Benjamin in Adorno that the latter can 
be read immanently, as we are attempting here. Thus we may see Adorno’s shoring up of 
Benjamin’s experimental, shape-shifting and unconditional thinking as the repressed condition of 
possibility for the explicit and implicit programs of Critical Theory and negative dialectics (to 
leave aside other originary figures such as Simmel, Kracauer, Bloch, et al., who are deemed by 
Adorno as insufficiently dialectical).  
And yet Adorno’s oeuvre, in its own right, is as equally unconditional and audacious as 
Benjamin’s and, further, resonates more with the contemporary social situation of academia. 
Benjamin has been dubbed the last European man of letters, although he never held an academic 
post; Adorno, on the other hand, was more thoroughly entrenched within academia. Benjamin 
lived nomadically and never had the institutional, much less financial, security afforded to 
Adorno, although the latter’s life was of course not without precarity.146 While Adorno’s corpus 
therefore needs to be assessed as being colored by its institutionality (literally, The Institute for 
Social Research) it must also be approached with an eye to its undeniable claims to extra-
institutionality. Indeed, Adorno is able to transcend his putatively ‘academic’ status and 
emplotment by means of a form of interdisciplinary research and writing that gestically engages 
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a mosaic of empirical-scientific and critical-speculative discourses and forms of criticism, which 
combine to make up a veritable prism.  
 
V. Dialectic of Retrieval 
One reason why we are drawn to Adorno’s thought is due to its unconditional 
interdisciplinarity whose critical power entices us to take it up for the critique of contemporary 
social phenomena.147 In taking up his work, we find ourselves standing amidst a stream of 
discontinuous traditions, narratives and critical models, all of whose afterlives, as a function of 
historical change, compel us to receive them critically and reconfigure them immanently via 
historical metacritique. In brief, Adorno’s work is compelling because it makes possible the 
cohabitation of a manifold of critical models whose nexus one a priori inhabits when engaging 
his thought.148 What is at stake in receiving Adorno’s work is thus not only the digestion of 
historical experience as such but also the transmissibility and interpenetration of modes of 
critique for this very activity of digestion.  
The interdisciplinarity of Adorno’s thought does not result in or stem from a colonizing 
gesture. Rather, each lens of Adorno’s prism gains potential authority—its plausibility for being 
meaningful and potentially ‘true’—by means of an eloquence that is born of its own self-
reflexivity and submission (i.e., object-dependence) to ‘history,’ the latter grasped as both the 
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“the life of society is the result of all the work done in the various sectors of production” (Horkheimer, “Traditional 
and Critical Theory,” 197). If these academic disciplines do not communicate, their disjointedness expresses an 
objective disunity of society, one that needs to be overcome not only in thought. 
148 “The perpetual entry in medias res” one experiences when engaging with Adorno’s work, Hullot-Kentor argues, 
“is not epical but philosophical: it is the thinking feel of being in the midst of the object, sometimes at the height of 
its antagonistic conflicts” (Hullot-Kentor, TBR, 15). In this sense, there is no proper arche of Adorno’s thought. 
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transmission of emphatic and critical experiences (in the service of self-determining social 
freedom), and ‘history’ also as the unfolding of a historically determinate but alien immanent 
necessity: collective unfreedom under capitalist modernity. It is in this sense that Adorno’s 
concept of immanent dialectical criticism is modeled on Marx’s dialectical critique of ‘capital,’ 
which Marx discerned as simultaneously opening up and closing off possibilities: post-capitalist 
society and social regression, respectively. It should be appropriately stressed that Marx’s 
interests were not anti-capitalist per se. Rather Marx sought to transcend capitalism, as Lenin put 
it, on its own basis, from within—to “build socialism,” Lenin writes, “not with abstract human 
material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material 
bequeathed to us by capitalism.”149 
Adorno’s prismatic and metacritical engagement with a manifold of discursive traditions 
and models of critique explores the conditions of im/possibility for the discontinuous continuity 
of the various modern discursive traditions he inherits, as well as their speculative intermingling 
into a differentiated chorus. The underlying gesture/thought-figure common to the various 
conditions of im/possibility explored by Adorno—for instance, the im/possibility of emphatic 
artistic praxis and aesthetic experience (Aesthetic Theory), or the im/possibility of philosophy 
and metaphysical (nonsensuous) experience (Negative Dialectics))—is that of self-
comprehension, which almost always means for Adorno, historical or sedimentary self-
comprehension. Yet if this gesture seeks to engage and sustain, there is also a temporal spacing 
or distancing immanent to this thought-figure whose guiding impulse is that of recovery and 
retrieval. (Note should be made here of the family resemblance between Adorno’s thought and 
Freudian psychoanalysis, which can be broadly understood as a form of psycho-linguistic self-
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comprehension.150) Self-comprehension—or what we might variously term a certain dialectic of 
retrieval—entails the recovery of the origin of a critical experience and the uncovering of how 
this origin persists, insofar as its immanent truth content is not only pertinent and eloquent but 
also has a claim on the present that demands its liquidation through belated fulfillment, in other 
words, its redemption.  
By invoking the origin of the critical experience from which a critical model issues, 
Adorno is able to free a critical model and its concepts from their binding force of cathexis-
compulsion and self-preservation; the subsequent employment of de-cathected/-reified critical 
models and their concepts will have direct consequences for questions concerning the 
presentation (Darstellung) and arrangement of interdisciplinary criticism. Insofar as “concepts 
become available for an association as they are associated in the object itself,” constellation—
instead of linear reasoning—becomes an alternative form of critical presentation and writing by 
means of which ideas, concepts and phenomena can be associated on the basis of affinity,151 as 
Benjamin would first emphatically explore in the Trauerspiel.152 In a letter from 1941, Adorno 
would express to Horkheimer how their shared philosophical reflections were “gestures taken 
from concepts,” but for which “the whole labour of conceptualization” was nevertheless 
demanded.153 
The gestic and citational character of what we are calling the politics of experience 
operative in the works of Benjamin and Adorno—within which historical experience is 
sedimented—rests upon an unrestricted practice of collecting critical experiences, which the 
construction of constellations then goes beyond by means of an allegorical apprehension of these 
                                                   
150 See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (1968). 
151 See Adorno, Hegel, 41. 
152 Benjamin, Trauerspiel, 35. “Note should be made of the psychoanalytic source of this idea of an association that, 
freed from its defensive purpose, allows ideas to come into a potentially liberating order” (Hullot-Kentor, TBR, 14).  
153 Müller-Dooh, Adorno, 278. 
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experiences.154 Indeed, collecting operates by means of a freedom to choose that falls outside the 
perennial, historically determinate ebb and flow of the circulation of commodities and their 
attendant subjective consumption. The active collecting of critical experiences, thereby implying 
their self-comprehension, in turn makes possible the digestion and transmissibility of such 
experiences elsewhere. Occasioned here is thus the question of how history—taken as a mosaic 
of ‘past’ experiences—is transmissible in and through language and writing: the proper space-
times where, following Benjamin, dialectical images can be conjured and where questions of 
presentation, form and method obtain. 
What we might call Adorno’s modernism, which is integral to his pre-politics, operates 
on a certain critical experience of history that is registered immanently through the various 
histories of modern literature, art, politics, philosophy, psychology, etc. What is at stake in these 
trajectories are precedents for capturing specific-singular and general-recursive aesthetic and 
extra-aesthetic crises under capitalist modernity. To be sure, the general and perennial character 
of many of these crises accounts for why we encounter Adorno endlessly returning to certain 
texts, figures and thought-figures throughout his corpus. Robert Hullot-Kentor, for one, has 
rightfully queried “whether Adorno’s prismatic use of concepts successfully escaped…the sum 
total of its origins.”155  
In the emergent history of modernist literature, for instance, the works of Baudelaire, 
Flaubert and Rimbaud become nexes of singular and protracted social-political crises and the 
corresponding subjective forms that register and express these crises on the level of experience; 
more precisely, on the level of aesthetic-literary praxis.156 The Hegelian program for modern 
                                                   
154 Hullot-Kentor describes Adorno’s writing as “paratactical”: “Adorno uses the most condensed gestures to invoke 
rather than propound relevant philosophical arguments” (Adorno, AT, xvi). 
155 Hullot-Kentor, TBR, 15. 
156 Here we should recall Foucault’s identification of modern literature, in contradistinction to aesthetics, as a 
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literature Lukács would advance in Theory of the Novel (1915) is echoed by Benjamin in the 
opening to his essay “The Image of Proust” and would fittingly serve as a maxim for Adorno’s 
own modernism: “It has rightly been said that all great works of literature establish a genre or 
dissolve one—that they are, in other words, special cases.”157 Riven with rupture, the history of 
modernism thus becomes an unavowable tradition that can nevertheless be read as a continuous 
“history of determinate negations.”158 Extrapolating on the critical work of Pierre Jean Jouve, 
Adorno would trace in “Valéry’s Deviations” how the literary works of Rimbaud, Mallarmé, 
Valéry, Surrealism, Proust, et al., all emerged—to varying degrees—out of the left-wing and 
right-wing aesthetic and political tendencies latent in Baudelaire, to whom they would stand as 
immanent reconfigurations.159 
Reencountering Adorno’s modernism in extremis, which developed within the period 
Hobsbawm terms “the short twentieth century” (1914–1991) but which crests before the 
paradigms of post-modernism and -structuralism and the global transformations of neoliberalism 
took hold (being cut short by Adorno’s death in 1969), offers us the occasion to revisit the 
question and problem of critique and explore its conditions of im/possibility, given what we may 
now identify as a certain “stagnation” or exhaustion of Critical Theory that Habermas and 
Sloterdijk were among the first to register.160 This exhaustion has now, in the 21st century, been 
codified by contemporary thinkers such as Jacques Rancière, who has done much to challenge 
and think through Adorno’s cul-de-sac. Following Sloterdijk, it would seem that the Adornian 
project of Critical Theory—which for our purposes here can be broadly defined as the expression 
                                                                                                                                                                    
counter-science constituting “a perpetual principle of dissatisfaction” against the human sciences (Foucault, The 
Order of Things, 373). 
157 Benjamin, Selected Writings, 1927–1930, 237. 
158 Adorno, AT, 48. 
159 Adorno, Notes to Literature I, 137–174.  
160 Sloterdijk, CCR, xxxv. See Habermas, “Modernity: An Incomplete Project” and Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: 
the Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991.  
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of contemporary antinomies and the “becom[ing-] conscious of the history immanently 
sedimented in them”—has all but run out of steam.161 And yet Critical Theory has not liquidated 
itself; for to do so would mean making-obsolescent the ‘past’ need that gave rise to the 
emergence and apparent necessity of Critical Theory, which was none other than the failed and 
since abandoned overcoming of capitalist society and the struggle for what Marx called 
proletarian socialism, an overcoming—the possibility of a post-capitalist, emancipated form of 
social life—which the historically specific, dialectical dynamic of capital simultaneously 
engenders and constrains. To be sure, now well into the 21st century, it is self-evident that 
nothing about critique—to invoke the Adornian refrain—can be taken for granted as self-evident. 
Engaging Adorno, whose corpus conveniently marks off a historical epoch, makes possible a 
certain disattachment from many of the post-‘60s/New Left discontents and concerns that now 
preoccupy contemporary 21st century discourses and practices. For this reason, however, such a 
disattachment could be perceived as untimely or worse, irresponsible; as an unnecessary 
engagement with a ‘bygone’ figure. Yet insofar as the Left appears persistently plagued by its 
own disseminated problematics, returning to Adorno proves to be a timely endeavor.  
 
VI. “Nothing New Under The Sun” 
What remained theoretically inadequate in Hegel and Marx became part of historical 
praxis; that is why it is to be theoretically reflected upon anew, instead of thought bowing 
irrationally to the primacy of praxis; this was itself an eminently theoretical concept. 
                                          —Adorno162 
 
It goes without saying at our historical juncture that there is no self-evident line leading 
beyond capitalist society; nor is there, as we will explore in the fourth chapter, a clear or obvious 
                                                   
161 Adorno, AT, 118. What Sloterdijk identifies as an enlightened false consciousness can be seen as a new way of 
expressing what in Adorno figures as the regression of consciousness, i.e., consciousness’ becoming-identical to 
reality and consequent loss of autonomy. 
162 Adorno, ND, 144. 
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remedy for anthropogenic global warming. There is, however, a road leading back into bourgeois 
society which makes possible an intensification of a project of freedom that has yet to be 
liquidated: a task registered, however variously, by radical bourgeois figures such as Rousseau, 
Kant, Hegel, Marx, et al. As we have noted, the capacity for and possibility of othering the world 
is alienated and in ruins. Hence the productivity of tracing the antinomies that emerge out of the 
breakdown of the emphatic, but in no way unproblematic (and hence in need of metacritical and 
immanent reconfiguration), task of freedom that is varyingly hallucinated in the radical 
bourgeois philosophy and political economy of Rousseau, Adam Smith, et al; the Enlightenment 
philosophy of Kant; the post-Enlightenment philosophy of Hegel; and the so-called “Second 
Enlightenment” of Marx and Engels—all of which find their afterlives, as Adorno argues, in 
“historical praxis.”163  
Adorno, “the last defender of the bourgeois tradition against the horrors of the 20th 
century”—and also simultaneously its premier critic and undertaker—stands as a signpost to this 
radical bourgeois lineage.164 At the same time, his work also stands as a cipher for understanding 
the difficulty of receiving and making good on the tasks handed down by this tradition. Running 
counter to our own attempt to receive the messages Adorno bequeathed and the figures whose 
thought he sustains, we are confronted with the Benjaminian-Adornian discourse on the decay 
and resultant im/possibility of emphatic (metaphysical/nonsensuous) experience; a registered 
fragmentation of experience under late-capitalist modernity that may in fact prevent us from 
inheriting these veritable messages. In short, this is the thesis of the historical disintegration and 
synchronic sliding of experience, the latter finding expression in apperceptive distractedness, 
reified disinterestedness, etc. 
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The possibility of “the new” (“the dialectically produced”), the possibility that something 
beyond the eternal return of the same under late-capitalist society can appear, is an indirect 
concern of Freudian psychoanalysis and an explicit problematic for Adornian negative dialectics, 
which philosophically engages and immanently reconfigures Freudian psychoanalysis under 
changed historical conditions.165 Like psychoanalytic practice and theory, Adorno’s work also 
shares a “fundamental practical orientation toward freedom,” for which the new is its discursive 
index.166 Yet while the desideratum is no doubt the new, everywhere Adorno’s texts are weighed 
down with the old, the ever-same and ‘nature’ in the critical Hegelian sense of the “mere 
reproduction of what has already been.”167  
The liminality of the limit-concept of “the new” in Adorno’s corpus, moreover, the fact 
that any and all positive images of the future and a reconciled society are tabooed except for the 
negative images refracted through immanent critique, reflects and is mimetic of the 
im/possibility of the emergence of the new.168 Indeed, as we will soon explore, Adorno’s corpus 
may itself even be characterized as natural-historical; as submissive to history as an apparently 
“natural force in which one is constantly being carried along.”169 In Adorno’s historical 
metacritiques and in his own programmatic works proper, the “weight of history” effectuates 
“the transmutation of metaphysics into history”: “It secularizes metaphysics,” he writes, “into the 
secular category pure and simple, that of decay.”170 As, for instance, in his so-called metacritique 
of Husserl, Adorno argues that in the former’s hands, “the decaying concepts of epistemology 
                                                   
165 Hullot-Kentor, TBR, 267. It should be noted that Adorno’s Habilitationsschrift was on Kant and Freud; the figure 
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170 Adorno, ND, 360. 
  62 
point beyond themselves”; such concepts are “a bit of unconscious transcription of history. For 
they must be helped to procure self-consciousness against that which they explicitly mean.”171 
The imputed weighty and intransigent character of Adorno’s work may thus be seen as pointing 
to and rendering legible the object of dialectical critique and its sedimented history of failed self-
overcomings. However, to portray Adorno’s thought as natural-historical is not to say that his 
thinking is devoid of plasticity or openness. 
The intransigence of Adorno’s thought has rarely been seen positively or as meriting 
much historico-philosophical interest. Instead, it is typically lamented or even derided in favor of 
new models of critique that, even within the hermetic walls of academia, bear the phantasmatic 
traces of the commodity character in their desublimated embraces of the new and the different, 
which of course in any emphatic or robust sense social reality categorically denies. Sloterdijk has 
characterized such intransigence as an “a priori pain” and “crypto-Buddhist spirit” that suffuses 
Adorno’s work.172 Sloterdijk’s own call to loosen up the mood of philosophy—to engage in a 
“new critique of temperaments,” instead of picking up the phone where Adorno left off—bars us 
from considering the potential use and productivity of Adorno’s so-called a priori pain.173 
Indeed, what Sloterdijk ends up abjuring in Adorno by pathologizing his thought is arguably 
what is productive and of historical interest in Adorno. If it was “astonishing” to Adorno “how 
few traces of human suffering one notices in the history of philosophy,” then the inverse 
proposition could be directed at his own work.174 Such a philosophical submission to history, for 
which Hegel is Adorno’s proper forbearer,175 raises the question of to what, if anything, 
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philosophy should not be receptive. 
The avowed intrusion of history into the scene of the writing of philosophy—meaning 
now history sets the terms for philosophy (exogenously) and of philosophy (immanently)—is 
embraced as early as Adorno’s 1931 inaugural lecture at the University of Frankfurt, “The 
Actuality of Philosophy,” where he argues that “only out of the historical entanglement of 
questions and answers does the question of philosophy’s actuality emerge precisely.”176 This 
encroachment of history upon philosophical discourse is brought to asystematic articulation in 
Negative Dialectics, which meditates on what it means to philosophize “after Auschwitz” and in 
the wake of the world-historical and political failures of Marxism and the Left, among other 
junctures.177  
In the Preface to Negative Dialectics and in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
professes that “history” “dictate[s]” the “concern[s] of philosophy.”178 Breaking the spell of what 
Freud polemically calls the “omnipotence of thought,” history can thus be said to constitute late-
modern philosophy’s proper Ur-text.179 The primacy of history for Adorno’s thought is 
demonstrated perhaps most powerfully in the “new categorical imperative” Hitler established: to 
“arrange” “unfree mankind’s” “thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so 
that nothing similar will happen.”180 Adorno would assume and carry out this imperative most 
exhaustively—on levels both psychological and sociological—in his post-WWII writings and 
lectures on education and pedagogy. The entanglement of history in Adorno’s work thus gives 
birth to his corpus’ persistent deadlocks and accumulated problematics. Hence the productivity 
of engaging his corpus as a whole rather than as a series of disarticulated studies, essays and 
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books: this is an attention to the ‘whole’ that Adorno’s writings on music, for instance, inculcate 
in the experience of listening to music.  
Given what we have identified as the encroachment of history upon his thought and the 
resultant sedimentation of historical experience (which anyone’s life unavoidably bears under 
capitalist society), what space is there, if any, for spontaneity and play in the work of Adorno? 
Certainly for Adorno, “[s]pontaneity appears to be trivial at the outset in the face of the factual 
supremacy of the objective conditions.”181 Perhaps if there is spontaneity and experimentation in 
Adorno’s thought it is achieved through what we have heretofore identified as his unconditional 
engagement with a manifold of empirical and critical-speculative discourses. A certain margin of 
play is also arrived at through the aesthetic and paratactical dimensions of his prose, which 
Hullot-Kentor has captured most concisely and forcefully. Such prose, we might say, sublimates 
the creative drive through a form of critical, multidisciplinary writing that reflexively expresses 
its own social unfreedom whence negative images of an emancipated world issue; not unlike that 
of Schoenberg’s music.182 
To be committed to engaging Adorno’s work is to sense that the past outweighs and 
molds the present and future tenses, and yet to also have an attendant, countervailing desire to 
inhabit the nexus of this weighty past with the desire for emphatic newness. In Adorno’s work, 
dialectical critique serves as the immanent channel between these two seemingly isomorphic 
poles that are in disagreement: on the one hand, a weighty past, and on the other, emphatic 
newness. Perhaps what we are so resistant to in Adorno’s work, that is, what is experienced as 
disagreeable in his thinking and on the level of his text, is the weightiness of history as an 
emplotment of unfreedom that we continue to share and identify with. It is this ‘insufferable’ 
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tarrying with the past that culminates in Sloterdijk’s declaration of the apparent dead-end of 
Adornian Critical Theory which operates in a supposed “crypto-Buddhist spirit.”183 
A politics or poetics of novelty would seemingly overcome this persistent cathexis of the 
past by opting for a spatial rather than a temporal model of criticism. By thinking spatially, as it 
were, the present is made available as not being weighed down by the past; a poetics of novelty, 
of how something new can emerge, can now be theorized without reference to the burden of 
historical weightedness. With this emphasis on spatiality, however, we lose an attunement to 
sedimentation; and thus we continue to sense that time overdetermines space—and are quickly 
drawn back to a poetics of tarrying.184 Perhaps what is perceived as ‘wrong’ in Adorno’s work—
i.e., what is democratically called out by the reader of Adorno and protested against—is the 
tarrying, the remarking upon historical sedimentation which of course Adorno is in disagreement 
with as well via criticism. We may broadly characterize or think of the intransigence of Adorno’s 
thought in terms of a form of submission to the preponderance of nature—in the Hegelian sense 
of the ever-same, and the Kantian realm of unfreedom/necessity—as opposed to that of 
becoming and self-overcoming.  
This intransigence of historical experience, subsumed immanently into philosophical 
writing, has made possible our metacritical reading of Adorno hitherto, which seeks to speak 
speculatively of Adorno’s corpus, that is, tout court. To be sure, the historical experience proper 
to Adorno’s oeuvre does not consist of the fragmentary experiences that Lukács’s History and 
Class Consciousness, in giving further phenomenal form to Marx’s Capital, would capture as 
normative under conditions of late-capitalist modernity. Instead, historical experience here 
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accumulates via a process of sedimentation, a concept Adorno uses to express a fraught non-
dialectic of being and becoming, of continuity and change: “everything new is weaker than the 
accumulated ever-same, and it is ready to regress back into it.”185 
It has become common to read what Richard Wolin, along with many others,186 has 
identified as Adorno’s “remarkable continuity,” which spans nearly four decades, as stemming 
from a certain obstinacy or inflexibility of his thinking: what Sloterdijk, for one, has lamented as 
Adorno’s “defensive thinking.”187 As Sloterdijk argues, “[p]olitically, and in its nerve endings, 
this aesthetic, this ‘sensitive’ theory [of Adorno’s], is based on a reproachful attitude, composed 
of suffering, contempt, and rage against everything that has power.”188 The sensitivity and 
receptivity of Adorno’s thought, coupled with its consistency, makes Adorno’s corpus something 
of a living-thought that can be addressed in its totality; as Barthes will similarly remark vis-à-vis 
Beethoven, “[his oeuvre’s] readability feeds on a sort of totality of the artist,” that is, a totality or 
consistency already immanent to Beethoven’s oeuvre proper.189 To grasp the former ‘whole’ 
means traversing the disparate works of Adorno’s corpus in order to contemplate its entirety, an 
aesthetic and critical experience that Adorno himself understood as having become increasingly 
impossible, for instance, in the experience of the ‘whole’ of a work of art. Of course the danger 
here is that of hijacking ‘Adorno’ as a totality, as a potentially reified object, and thereby making 
him amenable to various programmatic interests, such as academic leftist imperatives. 
The continuity of Adorno’s thought has typically been cast negatively, influenced not the 
least by his infamous critical engagement with the ‘60s German New Left which saw his 
intransigence as an obstacle—a perception captured here by Sloterdijk:  
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To remain sensitive was, as it were, a Utopian stance—to keep the senses sharpened for a 
happiness that will not come, a stance that nevertheless, by being prepared for happiness, 
protects us from the worst kind of brutalizations…In this sensitive critique, there is a 
paralyzing resentment…Adorno’s theory revolted against the collaborative traits 
embedded in the ‘practical attitude.’190 
 
To be sure, the perceived obstinacy of Adorno’s thought tends to be read as reflecting 
Adorno’s temperament (what Sloterdijk calls Adorno’s “emotional a priori”; a supposed 
regulative “concept of the Sensitive”) instead of his object.191 From the side of the object, such 
intransigence can be construed as productive in that it makes legible not only emphatic historical 
experience but also history in its discontinuous continuity. What we have captured above as the 
cathectically overdetermined character of Adorno’s work—which would seem to pose problems 
for the plasticity and responsiveness of his thinking to the singularity of the present—also makes 
possible its dense, rich, and often powerful character, insofar as critical-historical experience is 
thereby congealed in his writings. The textual presence of such historical experience, however, is 
not accidental but rather stems from the privileged status accorded to experience in his thinking; 
more precisely, the function of a philosophical concept of experience operative in his work, for 
which, as we will soon explore, Adorno is indebted to Benjamin.  
What appears as the obstinacy of Adorno’s thought is also bound up with the anxiety of 
his thinking in the face of social regression. For instance, Adorno took pains to memorialize, 
disseminate, and critically sustain Benjamin’s work, a life-long activity witnessed most 
poignantly in his eulogistic and archival essays on Benjamin (“Introduction to Benjamin’s 
Schriften”; “Benjamin the Letter Writer,” etc.). For Adorno, the historical trajectory that had 
issued from Benjamin’s death in 1940 endangered the very preservation and survival of his 
critical thought. Adorno’s labors to sustain Benjamin’s work point—however indirectly—to his 
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broader understanding of the social tendency of regression, a concept Adorno critically borrowed 
from psychoanalytic discourse and practice.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Given Adorno’s preoccupation with this tendency and the societal lapses into barbarism 
he witnessed during his life, we might push back here on Jacob Taubes’ excoriating reading of 
the “Finale” of Adorno’s Minima Moralia, which leads him to attack Adorno for being an 
“aesthete,” without recognizing the historical valences of the work’s closing aphorism—the 
beginning and end of which read:   
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of 
redemption…But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or 
unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.192 
 
What Taubes takes to be Adorno’s “aestheticization of the problem” of redemption here 
we might conversely see as Adorno’s willful and self-conscious critical objectification of the 
obstacle, which is manifest through the conspicuous distance he assumes vis-à-vis 
“redemption.”193 While Taubes places emphasis on the irreality of redemption for Adorno— 
arguing that Adorno only cares to entertain its virtual possibility but not its actuality—we might 
counter this reading by emphasizing that for Adorno here, “the demand…placed on thought” to 
strive for social redemption, more precisely, for social transformation, is in fact the only thing 
that “matters”; the ‘as-if’ is subordinate to the “besides.”194 In other words, it does not matter 
whether we contemplate the reality or unreality of redemption; only the task and struggle 
(mutually shared by thought and praxis) to change and thereby redeem the world can be our 
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concern. Hence Taubes’ Benjaminian critique of Adorno, which approaches him from the 
standpoint of critical-hermeneutical theology, misses what is critically and historically at stake in 
Adorno’s gnomic aphorism. Indeed, Adorno’s “Finale” (and much of his work more generally) 
remarks upon how critical thought itself––the condition of possibility for social transformation, 
through its non-identity with social being—is in danger of being eclipsed by a regressive social 
totality which has subsumed forcible, dialectical opposition to capitalist society and thereby 
perniciously molds society on levels both sociological and psychological by and large 
unchecked. Thus, as Adorno’s work seems to intimate, perhaps Benjamin’s philosophy of 
immanence is no longer tenable on account of the post-history of Benjamin’s work, which the 
latter could not have anticipated.            
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3. On the Convergence of Natural History and a Philosophical Concept 
of Experience 
 
 
To the eternity of the historical moment 
there corresponds an attitude which sees the 
way of the world as naturally fallen and 
invariant; the moment, the absolutely 
transient, is the likeness of the eternity of 
passing away, of damnation.—Adorno195 
     
 
 
Through the lens of Adorno’s own engagements with the idea of natural history 
(Naturgeschichte),196 his thought, I will argue, can itself be understood as natural-historical, 
tending toward sedimentation rather than self-overcoming, which in turn reflects the 
intransigence of the object of critique more than his thought itself. In his 1932 lecture “The Idea 
of Natural History,” containing, as Hullot-Kentor has noted, “the central elements of Adorno’s 
mature works,” Adorno would assimilate Benjamin’s Trauerspiel for the program of his own 
immanent dialectical criticism.197 Grasping the ambiguities and conceptual slippages immanent 
to the idea of natural history, Adorno understands the idea’s constitutive concepts of ‘nature’ and 
‘history’ as not only mutually determining but as also providing the key for demystifying each 
other’s ‘necessary forms of appearance.’198 Adorno would thus employ the concepts of nature 
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and history in much the same way as the early Lukács in order to break open the ideological 
fusion of nature and history that congeals in social phenomena and results in a reified second 
nature. The task Adorno set forth, Hullot-Kentor clarifies, was to “comprehend an object as 
natural where it appears most historical and as historical where it appears most natural.”199 This 
particular usage of the idea of natural history—which has a long history of mirror-stage like 
uses200—as a critical concept is also encountered in the Arcades Project, where Benjamin 
establishes “the axiom” “to avoid mythic thinking”: “No historical category without natural 
substance; no natural substance without its historical filter.”201  
For Adorno, the idea of natural history may be best understood as a certain “dialectical 
way of seeing” that attempts to comprehend history (ostensibly the domain of transformation and 
becoming) “in its eternal and total passing away,” and thereby grasp the natural in the 
historical.202 (And here it seems auspicious to draw the family resemblance between Adorno and 
Benjamin’s shared “thanatological model of interpretation” and Lenin’s ideas of the withering 
away of the state and the overcoming of bourgeois right. As Benjamin writes in a moment that 
inevitably evokes Lenin, “nature is Messianic by reason of its eternal and total passing away. To 
strive after such passing, even for those stages of man that are nature, is the task of world 
politics, whose method must be called nihilism.”203) “For radical natural-historical thought,” 
Adorno writes, “everything existing” (under capitalist modernity) “transforms itself into ruins 
and fragments.”204 To be sure, natural history would prove to be an idea that permeated Adorno’s 
thought; for instance, he would identify the task of the essay—critical to its core—as striving to 
“seek the eternal in the transient and distill it out; [the essay] tries to render the transient 
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eternal.”205 
Looking to “dialectically overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history” that 
animates large swaths of post-Kantian intellectual history, Adorno formulates, following 
Benjamin, what might be called a weak relation between nature and history that can be 
contrasted against the tangled and mediative relation between spirit (Geist) and nature in Hegel, 
and the rift encountered between freedom and nature in Kant’s idealism.206 In his early 1918 
essay “On the Program of the Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin had announced his desire to 
“abolish” the “distinction between the realms of nature and freedom” in Kant’s architectonic 
philosophy.207 Contesting this dichotomy, however, did not mean synthesizing or collapsing 
these two realms; rather Benjamin argued that “[a]nother relation between thesis and antithesis is 
possible besides synthesis.”208 Within the context of this essay, he would ultimately advocate 
(however vaguely) for “a certain nonsynthesis of two concepts in another.”209 Samuel Weber 
explains how, for this early Benjamin, thesis and antithesis (here, the Kantian spheres of freedom 
and nature) are to be brought together “in a relation that would not be subsumptive or reductive 
of their constitutive differences.”210 While Benjamin perhaps unwittingly repeated the Hegelian 
point of departure in advocating for a speculative rethinking of Kant (that seeks to dialectically 
mediate (neo-)Kantian antinomies), his early metacritique of Kant and Neo-Kantianism also 
represents what Osborne and Matthews have called “an attempt to construct an alternative post-
Kantian tradition to that of Hegelian dialectics.”211 Such a vertitable alternative is forged through 
Benjamin’s early formulations of constellation (a “nonsynthesis of two concepts in another”) and 
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his embrace of aesthetic experience as a capacious and quasi-mediative nexus between the 
otherwise antinomic or reified (post-)Kantian spheres of freedom (moral-political reason) and 
nature/unfreedom (experience).212  
As Beatrice Hanssen explicates, by suggesting history and nature were “commensurable” 
in “the moment of transience that befell both” Adorno saw Benjamin as challenging the 
“customary antithesis of nature and history” found in the German Idealist fissure between nature 
and freedom/history.213 Adorno would also embrace Benjamin’s idea of natural history as a 
challenge to Hegel’s idealist philosophy of history and as a corrective to the idealist trappings of 
phenomenology, the latter of which Adorno argued exhibited a constitutive “blindness to 
history.”214 The idea of natural history pointed to an “originary unity” and dialectical 
interpenetration between nature and history (rather than a rift), whose common origin was that of 
an originary transience.215 By emphasizing the transient and the process of decay that marked 
history, Hanssen explains how Adorno perceived Benjamin as “initiat[ing] the turn to another 
form of history, one no longer idealist in nature.”216  
Bringing Lukács’ Theory of the Novel and Benjamin’s Trauerspiel into dialogue, Adorno 
argues both texts share the same endeavor of transvaluing nature and the natural, and thereby not 
only call into question any idea of a “primary substance or arche” but also challenge the ‘vulgar’ 
philosophical concept of nature as simple “originary immediacy.”217 While Lukács demonstrated 
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the transformation of history into nature, resulting in a second nature (a concept borrowed from 
Hegel), Benjamin inversely conceived nature as “transitory nature,” i.e., nature as history.218 
Nature is hence no longer understood by Benjamin as “originary immediacy” but as originary 
transience, which in turn constitutes original history or archi-history.219 What surfaces in this Ur-
history is not nature as such but an originary decay. In revealing the fissure between signification 
(the sphere of history) and nature, Benjamin’s critical use of allegory in the Trauerspiel thereby 
exposes how “nature bears the imprint of history.”220 Like nature, history in Benjamin’s hands 
also loses its organicity and self-sameness; in becoming entwined with nature it becomes 
“nature-history.”221 
 
I. Pharamakon of Natural History 
Adorno’s appropriation of Benjamin’s multivalent idea of natural history222 entails the 
philosophical assimilation of the concepts of transience, decay and disintegration; concepts 
which had, according to Adorno, been historically “downgrade[d]” (ontotheologically) by the 
Western philosophical tradition and considered “neglible.”223 Adorno’s concern for such themata 
would reappear programmatically in his late work Negative Dialectics where he argued in the 
Introduction that “the matters of true philosophical interest at this point in history are those in 
which Hegel, agreeing with tradition, expressed his disinterest.”224 Here he would also cite 
“nonconceptuality, individuality and particularity” as additional concepts that needed to be 
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integrated into philosophical thinking and discourse by means of a capacious, indeed “spiritual” 
(geistige), concept of philosophical experience.225 In so doing, Adorno tacitly acknowledges his 
assimilation of Benjamin’s unconditional project of widening the philosophical concept of 
experience, which served as the grounds for Benjamin’s later explorations of the idea of natural 
history. 
In his 1918 metacritique of Kant and the contemporaneous Neo-Kantianism of his milieu, 
Benjamin argued that while Kant had been able to address the “question of knowledge that is 
lasting,” Kant’s epistemology had been unable to adequately address “the integrity of an 
experience that is ephemeral.”226 Benjamin accounted for this blindness by exposing how Kant 
had constructed his philosophy upon the “naked, primitive, self evident” Enlightenment concept 
of experience, whose paradigm was that of Newtonian physics.227 In this essay, “On the Program 
of the Coming Philosophy,” Benjamin consequently announced his intention to expand the 
limited spatio-temporal forms and causal-mechanistic categories of Kant’s philosophy through 
the integration of religious, artistic, historical, mythical, insane, linguistic, psychological, and 
other forms of experience. By incorporating more speculative phenomenological forms of 
experience into the arena of philosophical knowledge—for which he would nevertheless 
preserve the Kantian “demand for justification”—Benjamin exposed philosophy to experiences, 
themata and concerns that it had typically excluded or had not embraced self-consciously, much 
less emphatically.228 Such a capacious philosophical receptivity to experience as developed by 
Benjamin is programmatically invoked in the Introduction to Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, 
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which “expounds the concept of philosophical experience.”229 As Roger Foster has revealed in 
Adorno: The Recovery of Experience, “[t]he introduction to Negative Dialectics, which perhaps 
more than any other of Adorno’s writings contains the methodological key to his work, had 
originally carried the title of ‘a theory of spiritual [geistige] experience.’”230 This capacious 
concept of experience not only opens up the space for natural history but also serves as the 
condition of possibility for Adorno’s multi- and inter-disciplinary dialectical criticism, which he 
undertook in many divergent but interrelated contexts and fields throughout his life.231  
The downgraded concepts Benjamin strove to integrate into philosophical thinking, such 
as ephemerality, have a distinctly pharmakological effect on Adorno’s corpus. To be sure, ideas 
such as allegory and natural history are not imbued with the same negative-theological character 
in Adorno’s thought as they are in the early and even the late Benjamin (however allegorical they 
may be in the latter’s work). As Richard Wolin has observed, the “ideology-critical moments of 
categories such as allegory and natural history,” which find their most proximate origins in 
Benjamin’s thought, are divested of their “redemptive significance” in Adorno’s corpus.232 Such 
critical moments, Wolin argues, can only be brought to closure via “social praxis” for Adorno.233 
Wolin hence appropriately contrasts Adorno’s “purely negative idea of the function of theory” 
with that of the (“far removed”) “conception of redemptive criticism” Benjamin undertook in his 
early work.234 Lacking the negative-theological dimension of both Benjamin’s early and late 
iterations of critique, Adorno is thus forced to look beyond theory proper in order to account for 
not only why critical moments cannot be brought to completion via social praxis, but moreover, 
why praxis itself is not transformative; or worse, why it has become regressive.  
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While the ideas Adorno inherited from Benjamin and salvaged from the one-way street of 
history open up the space for the healing of accumulated historical suffering and memory 
through philosophy, they also, at the same time, further expose philosophy to an ever-steepening 
balance-sheet of suffering which tends—as Adorno witnessed, for instance, in the cultural 
response to the Holocaust—to only be met with collective amnesia and subjective repression.235 
Hence it is as if in Adorno’s work Benjamin’s thought becomes fully secularized and loses its 
halo, as Benjamin wrote apropos Baudelaire. In the wake of the horrors of the twentieth century 
and upon his return to post-WWII West Germany after his exile in America, Rolf Tiedemann 
describes how Adorno “continued in his thinking to reflect upon actual history and the processes 
eroding it.”236 Hullot-Kentor similarly writes that “[t]he whole of Adorno’s philosophy…right 
through [to] Negative Dialectics, stood before him in this brief talk [“The Idea of Natural 
History”] as a capacity to present the reality of history with an unprecedented starkness of 
philosophical consciousness.”237 Perhaps nowhere is Adorno’s submission to a regressive (if 
minimally progressive) historical process more vividly captured than in his transcribed and 
posthumously published lectures, where his faltering voice continually repeats the same central 
thought-figures and becomes caught in a ceaseless, tarrying dialectic of retrieval. In a footnote 
later appended to Negative Dialectics, Adorno would confess that “[t]he idea of a logic of 
disintegration is the oldest of [my] philosophical conceptions, going back to [my] student 
years.”238  
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II. Conclusion 
 
      …the possibility of action in lingering and the promise of freedom in action.—Fred Moten239  
 
Adorno’s corpus, which is arguably more emphatically and classically Marxist than 
Benjamin’s, is also decidedly more natural-historical than the latter’s insofar as it more 
noticeably bears, on the level of the text, the marks of decay of its object. In other words, and as 
we have studied hitherto, natural-historical experience is more conspicuously objectivated and 
made-manifest in Adorno’s writings. Heretofore we have encountered such decay in the charted 
decline and atrophy of forcible, dialectical forms of opposition to capitalist society (via collective 
praxis) and their resultant incapacity, which transpired during Adorno’s lifetime and are 
registered in his overall corpus. Through the “allegorical vision” which opens up the space-time 
for natural history, Benjamin describes in the Trauerspiel how “all that is human…not only the 
nature of human existence in general but the biographical historicity of an individual is 
enunciated in this figure [“a death’s head”] of the most extreme subjugation to nature.”240 It is 
perhaps in this sense that Adorno’s living-thought may be thought to be subject to ‘nature’: to 
transience and decay as a form of original history, and to that which is static or worse, 
regressing. After all it is that which does not change, which Adorno called “[t]he other, less 
popular aspect of dialectic,” that properly concerns his negative dialectic.241  
Thus far we have explored what it might mean to read Adorno’s living-corpus as natural-
historical in its entire composition, 1931–1969. Further, by framing our engagement with 
Adorno through a post-1917 prism, we have also sought to render legible a historical trajectory 
that is non-identical to critical reflection, and to study how this exogenous process became 
entangled with and is expressed in and through his thinking. Yet aside from maintaining their 
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non-identity, what is the proper distance—we might ask—to establish towards Adorno’s writing, 
on the one hand, and its concomitant concrete historical experience on the other? Of course in 
approaching Adorno it seems imperative not to crudely reduce thought to history, or vice versa; 
indeed herein lies the modicum of freedom for critical thinking: in the space between history and 
experience. And yet through the eyes of Adorno’s own philosophy, as we now know well, 
critique frequently appears entirely helpless vis-à-vis an alienated historical dynamic that 
continues apace unchecked, insofar as it can only lend critical digestion to its object. It is in this 
sense that Moishe Postone’s contemporary thematization of helplessness may be understood as a 
faint echo of the post-Adornian disintegration of theory since the post-1917 aftermath—theory 
now being exceedingly severed and alienated from praxis.242 As we will study in the coming 
chapter, this experience of helplessness resonates with the contemporary experience of ongoing 
and future anthropogenic global warming which, along with a manifold of other interlocking 
social problematics, stands incapable of being adequately redressed via social praxis.  
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4. A Critical Reading of Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century 
Helplessness in the Face of Climate Change (2015) 
 
 
 
 
One must insist that transference is the 
formal source of the creative processes that 
inspire the exodus of humans into the open. 
We do not so much transfer incorrigible 
affects onto unknown persons as early 
spatial experiences to new places, and 
primary movements onto remote locations. 
—Sloterdijk243 
 
 
 
I. An Embrace of Transference 
1. Everywhere, even here, environmental politics (praxis that seeks to redress the 
perceived environmental crisis244) is being held to a new criterion that syncopates with the 
desideratum of the traditional, and now historical, Left: minimally, radical social transformation. 
By ‘the Left’ we do not mean to denote a singular, monolithic entity or actually-existing object 
but rather a manifold of unresolved antinomies, or dialectics at a standstill, stemming from the 
past which animate the present. The Left also notably persists, following Leszek Kolakowski, as 
an idea, in the sense of an aggregate or constellation of extremes.245  
2. Re: the query of whether there is “any prospect for an ideological unification of 
environmentalism and the [desiderata of the] traditional left?” we might argue that, on a 
historico-philosophical register, it is already transpiring—perhaps spontaneously and 
unconsciously—in response to ongoing and intensifying anthropogenic global warming.246 The 
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notion of the allegorical imbrication of these two historico-political trajectories and the 
speculative conjunction of their respective messianisms is intimated in the provocative closing 
lines of Andrew Feenberg’s essay “Beyond the Politics of Survival” (1979):  
The environmental crisis, in short, brings not peace but a sword. And precisely for that 
reason it is not a unifying messianic force through which the human race could join in an 
ennobling struggle beyond the petty conflicts of history. Rather, it is a new terrain on 
which the old, old issues will be fought out, perhaps this time to a conclusion.247  
 
3. While the traditional Left understood surpassing the horizon of socialism, that is, 
attaining socialism, as necessitating the determinate negation or self-overcoming of capitalist 
society, what it would mean to ‘surpass’ or ‘overcome’ global warming seems much less clear or 
straightforward. This lack of clarity will lead us, below, to ask after and query the desiderata of 
environmental politics and allegorically constellate the latter with the history of the Left. 
4. In both contemporary scientific and social-scientific discourse surrounding climate 
change, the emphases (and frequent co-joining) of a) transformation/change (whether passive or 
active) and b) the social dimension of global warming (whether exogenous or anthropogenic) 
have reached a fever pitch: 
a) i) “the problems of political transformation” concern precisely “getting from the 
unecological present to an ecological future.” 
ii) “The impact of climate change on natural ecosystems and on human society and 
economies is potentially severe, ranging from sea level rise and melting ice at higher 
latitudes (Arctic and Antarctic) and altitudes (mountain glaciers), to changing weather 
patterns characterized by increasingly severe storms, floods and droughts, and the 
attendant impacts of these changes.” 
iii) “Those societies that respond to environmental and other stresses by transformation 
rather than collapse have the capability to question their core values if they become 
dysfunctional and to drive fundamental shifts in those values, leading to more adaptive 
and resilient societies.”248 
 
b) i) Adequately reckoning with global warming increasingly appears to mean, as 
Melathopoulos and Stoner argue in Freedom in the Anthropocene, “taking hold of broad 
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social processes that are seemingly more complex and incomprehensible than [for 
instance,] the dynamic chemical processes and patterns of aerosol movements in the 
stratosphere.” 
ii) “The emergence of climate change as a central political issue around the world, along 
with growing concern for the environment more generally, has raised the challenge to 
achieve sustainability as a high order social goal.” 
iii) “Today, the possibilities for environmental change have become linked to the 
redefinition of the environmental movement and its capacity to transform society itself.” 
iv) To be sure, the social dimension of global warming concerns, at its most elementary, 
“the very conditions, both biological and geological, on which the survival of human life 
as developed in the Holocene period depends.”249 
 
 
II. The Status of Scientific Research 
5. While environmental scientists and sociologists250 alike exhibit the capacity to describe 
the crisis in its objectivity and its ‘total’ dimension (for instance, the long-term effects of climate 
change, and humanity’s ability to transform the objective character of the world251), a growing 
concern for environmental scientists and sociologists is how “rising consciousness of 
environmental degradation” (such as increased popular awareness or greater techno-scientific 
understanding) does not necessarily lead to, or translate into, ecologically meliorative changes in 
humanity’s objective transformation of the world.252 For a veritable chorus of scientists and 
sociologists, this contradiction highlights and points to the “runaway” and alien character of 
anthropogenic global warming which, by and large, continues apace unchecked.253 As Joern 
Fischer, et al. contend (2007), “[d]espite increasing efforts at all levels of society to create a 
sustainable future, global-scale indicators show that humanity is moving away from sustainability 
rather than towards it”; further, they write that scientists recurringly find that “their actions in the 
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world end up being frustrated and turn into ‘politically mediated compromises that fall far 
short.’”254  
Herein we should note that much of the research environmental science produces tends to 
lack the capacity for dialectical critique, that is, the ability to point in the direction of its object’s 
transformation on the basis of its non-identical immanence to its object. Seeking to bolster the 
critical reflexivity of scientific research apropos global warming, Bruno Latour has aptly noted 
that “[w]hile the older problem of science studies was to understand the active role of scientists 
in the construction of facts, a new problem arises: how to understand the active role of human 
agency not only in the construction of facts, but also in the very existence of the phenomena 
those facts are trying to document.”255 
 
III. Whence Environmental Politics? (i) 
6. In the face of intensifying, unforeseeable (scientific and predictive indeterminacy256) 
and (largely) unavowable climate change, the perceived failure257 of environmental politics and 
movements—let alone ‘mainstream’ politics, and the imbrication of forms of eco-politics 
therein—to adequately bring about the social transformation that now appears increasingly 
necessary to mitigate, much less avert, the manifold effects of anthropogenic global warming, 
has called into question the ‘origin’ as well as the ‘prehistory’ of eco-politics. The conspicuous 
arche of eco-politics, which emerged between the 1960s–80s in North America and Europe258 as 
a distinct, sui generis and recognizable form of politics, has become an ever-present origin that is 
recurringly retrieved in the critical literature surrounding eco-politics.  
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Retrieving this origin, A.D. Tarlock, for one, has argued that environmental politics 
attained its “first peak of political power between 1968 and 1972 when it moved beyond the 
progressive conservation vision to a more holistic theory of social and economic order,” thereby 
marrying the “multi-level activism” of the civil rights and anti-war movements of the ‘60s with 
environmental protection and conservation movements.259 Yet despite these political heights, 
which arose in the wake of the “post-WWII spike in environmental degradation [that] gave rise 
to new environmental needs and desires,” Melathopoulos and Stoner contend in Freedom in the 
Anthropocene that “the environmental discontent expressed by contemporary environmentalism 
[of the ‘60’s–70’s] failed to engender changes in social structure conducive to moving beyond 
the societally induced environmental degradation which characterizes this period.”260 To be sure, 
if environmental discontents (like any other form of discontent) are not reflexively non-identical 
to the society it opposes and protests a ‘wrong’ against, these discontents are blunted and readily 
integrated into society. In turn, such discontents become means of perpetuating the status quo of 
an alienated social dynamic. Thus, the co-authors of Freedom in the Anthropocene insist: 
“[e]nvironnmentalism remains identical with society while appearing opposed to it.”261 Indeed, 
since the 1970s, environmental discontents—and eco-politics in the global north more broadly— 
have become increasingly integrated into society via broad processes of institutionalization, 
nationalism, environmental policy (“a system designed to manage and control rather than reduce 
or restructure the sources of pollution and other environmental ills”), etc.262 
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IV. Discontents with Eco-politics 
7. From Outside: Critiques of the perceived ‘inefficacy’ of eco-politics can be found 
across large swaths of scientific and sociological discourse from the past two decades. Consider, 
a) Røpke (2005): “the ‘implementation deficit’ that followed the creation of national government 
environmental agencies in the early 1970s in many OECD countries”; b) Blühdorn (2007) and 
Steffen, et al. (2008): “the failure to guide economic development along the sustainable 
development framework outlined by the Brundtland Report in 1987”; c) Blühdorn (2013) and 
Karlsson (2013): “the sense of helplessness that attends the most recent turn to protest-oriented 
climate justice.”263 From the standpoint of the retroactive present, the mass of these perceived 
shortcomings and failures (among others) points to the runaway post-WWII dynamic of the 
‘Great Acceleration,’ which delimits a period of intensified impact on the environment that leads 
straight to the present. To be sure, this mediative society-environment dynamic continues 
seemingly unabated, so long as forcible and dialectical opposition to capitalist society is 
dormant.  
From Inside: In an interview with Andony Melathopoulos, the American environmental 
lawyer and advocate James Gustave Speth captures the contradiction between the evident growth 
of environmental-isms and the overarching failure to satisfactorily redress the ecological crisis 
via social transformation: “We now have a flourishing environmental movement, a proliferating 
number of organisations, more and more money going into this, decades now of environmental 
legislation and programs, at all levels of government, and the environment keeps going 
downhill.”264 Further, as Melathopoulos provides running commentary, “[t]he contradiction, 
according to Speth, results from the U.S. environmental movement focusing too narrowly on 
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‘working within the system.’ They lobby, litigate and educate the public to the neglect of an 
‘equally powerful effort to change the system itself.’”265 
 
V. Narrativizing the Trajectory of Eco-politics 
8. In many critical histories of environmental politics and movements, such as Robert 
Gottlieb’s canonical Forcing the Spring (1993), little attention is paid to the extra-national and 
geopolitical prehistory of eco-politics. The political imaginary of the “environmental humanities 
in the United States” in particular, as Bob Nixon has noted, is especially “skewed toward nation-
bound scholarship that is at best tangentially international and, even then, seldom engages the 
environmental fallout of U.S. foreign policy head on.”266 Beyond this imaginary, the general-
historical prehistory of eco-politics we are asking after here, which flashes up in the face of 
intensifying climate change, would doubtless seem, prima facie, discontinuous and extraneous to 
the historical trajectory of environmental politics. Such a prehistory, for our purposes here, 
would encompass the historico-political dynamics of progress/regression stemming from the 
mid-19th century, which witnessed both the first ‘real subsumption’ of social life under capitalist 
society as well as the agonistic emergence of a proletarian politics. These historical dynamics, 
which further played out in the twentieth century on the world-historical stage and lead to the 
present, constitute, for our purposes here, the a priori conflictual world out of and into which 
eco-politics emerges. (From a Marxian purview, we should recall that “[t]he task of freedom in 
the nineteenth century—that of consciously recognizing and actively transforming social 
structure—was inextricably linked to the question of the political activity of the proletariat.”267) 
Thus Benjamin’s image of origin as a “maelstrom [Strudel]” “in the flow of becoming” is 
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instructive for grasping this complex emergence (Entstehen) of environmental politics 
(Entstehen: (literally) “arising, in the sense of taking a stand, assuming a stance”).268 
9. It has become common for critical histories of environmentalism to commence by 
briefly remarking upon or confessing their object’s entropic posthistory; for example, 
Christopher Rootes (1999): “It is an oversimplification to say that the environmental movement 
has undergone a change from being a mass participatory movement to a series of institutionalised 
interest groups.”269 Because the period of the ‘60s–80s stands as the conspicuous arche of 
recognizable environmental politics in the global north, it seems appropriate that attempts to 
broach the speculative revivification or reconstitution of such politics recurringly query whether 
its “adaptations ultimately weaken the capacities of EMOs [environmental movements] to effect 
the mass mobilisations from which the EMO’s power initially derived and upon which it may 
ultimately depend.”270 Through the persistant retrieval of its origin, the critical literature 
surrounding the trajectory and outcome of environmentalism points to the necessity for this 
praxis to grasp its own historical emplotment.  
In the essays composing Rootes’ edited collection, Environmental Movements, the only 
trace of non- or extra-reformist iterations of eco-politics resides in the pseudo-tension Rootes 
establishes between “[c]onventional and unconventional forms of action.”271 The latter is given 
little-to-no voice, let alone ontological status, within this specific critical compendium on 
environmental politics—but still nevertheless exists at its margins. Gottlieb, for one, has 
addressed the problem of “defining contemporary environmentalism primarily in reference to its 
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mainstream, institutional forms.”272 “Such historians,” Gottlieb continues, “cannot account for 
the spontaneity and diversity of an environmentalism rooted in communities and constituencies 
seeking to address issues of where and how people live, work [etc.]”—the latter which lie 
outside of these former mainstream iterations.273 In the early case of the United Kingdom’s 1956 
Clean Air Act (which predated the landmark U.S. 1970 Clean Air Act by more than ten years), 
the extra-parliamentary pressure-group the National Smoke Abatement Society was a key force 
in legislating the Act, which helped precipitate the U.K.’s creation of a national environmental 
policy. 
 
VI. Whence Eco-politics? (ii) 
10. The ‘origin’ of environmental politics, which now appears as emerging within and 
out of more general-historical configurations and fields of contestation that seem to delimit—or 
at least pose problems for—its imputed possibilities for society-shaping, arises from the 
posthistory274 of this sui generis form of politics, in other words, its outcome. Such a retroactive 
relation between outcome and origin is given expression here by Rootes:  
Of all the ‘new’ social movements which emerged from the student movements of the 
late 1960s, it is environmental movements which have had most enduring influence on 
politics and which have undergone the most wide-ranging institutionalisation in terms 
both of the professionalisation of their activies and of the regularisation of their access to 
policy-makers.275 
 
As Rootes indicates here, the efficacy and survival of this specific post-‘60s iteration of 
politics has been inseparable from its transmutation and accommodation via social forms of 
institutionalization. In The Greening of a Nation (1998), Hal Rothman will echo this diagnosis in 
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remarking how the environmental movement is paradoxically a “victim of its own successes.”276 
As Rootes writes elsewhere, one result of such institutionalization has been that the 
environmental movement no longer “capture[s] the imagination or command[s] the support of 
any large part of the public.”277 Broad declines in public protests since the ‘70s have been seen 
by some (Diani and Donati (1999)) as a key indicator of the public demobilization caused 
by such adaptions. 
11. It should be stressed that the general history in which eco-politics is tenuously being 
placed and situated here is open to determination and contestation: ideally no privilege or 
primacy should be accorded to any single discursive hermeneutic, historical trajectory, or voice 
over another. Although it may be impossible to ever not occupy a standpoint, Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics nevertheless ventures to counterpose dialectics (or alternatively, dialectical critique) to 
standpoint; thus Adorno’s maxim, “dialectics not a standpoint.”278 Against ‘standpoint,’ the 
demos and its voicings of a ‘wrong’ not only haunt political community (contra the sensible 
order of the police) but also haunt academic/discursive writing as a liminal non-identity 
immanent to (policed) discursivity and discursive taboos, the former of which exceed these 
enframings. 
 
VII. The Anthropocene?  
12. The recently-surfaced and -popularized concept of the Anthropocene has sought to 
categorically inaugurate a new geological age wherein humanity is understood as the greatest 
determinant of the global environment of the planet (e.g., its geology and ecosystems) following 
the Industrial Revolution. Yet as Melathopoulos and Stoner have argued, the Anthropocene as an 
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account of  
what generates [socio-biophysical] change ends up linear [and such reified linearity ends 
up] without the potential for being otherwise. This failure to specify the type of 
transformation and its conditions of possibility ends up in the externalization of the 
factors of transformation. Consequently, scholars have yet to specify the dynamic that is 
generative of the current environment-society crisis.279 
 
It is thus crucial to note the hallucinatory and thereby reified character of retroactively 
projected origins such as the Anthropocene, which negatively capture how, rather than self-
consciously transforming the socio-biophysical world, humanity is subject to and dominated by 
the history they have set in motion. To be sure, as Melathopoulos and Stoner contend, “it is 
precisely history that appears to ensnare human society in a runaway developmental pattern that 
will not lead to the opening of human capacities and the flourishing of ecosystems, but rather to 
the inevitable diminishing of both.”280 In addition to its hypostatized linearity, the historico-
geological concept also fails to directly address the political dimension of the ecological crisis 
and the agonistic politics contained within the historical period it spans. 
Despite its mystified character, it is important nevertheless to grasp ‘the Anthropocene’—
which currently has scientific, academic, artworld and popular traction—as expressing a 
deepening and broadening of ecological subjectivity. Crutzen (2002) and Steffen, et al. (2011) 
note that while “Anthropocene-like periodization” emerged as early as 1873, “it has only 
recently become the subject of debate at international geological meetings and in the popular 
media.”281 Yet, as Melathopoulos and Stoner argue, “[c]ut off from its historical and dialectical 
genesis, the concept of the Anthropocene advanced by Crutzen, et al. is unable to effectively 
grasp how a society that emerges from the Industrial Revolution can be both conscious of the 
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degradation of planetary systems and seemingly powerless to do anything about it.”282 And yet, 
the co-authors nevertheless maintain that “[a]ctual (critical) recognition of today’s worldwide 
ecological crises would mean recognizing this thought itself as a form of reified consciousness, 
so that the inherently irreducible, emancipatory potential contained within might be unleashed.” 
Indeed, to acknowledge a thought as reified opens up the space for exploring how theory proper 
might move beyond itself into a speculative relationship with praxis, so that the potency of 
critical thought may come to fruition.283 
13. As Chakrabarty observes, “the current [objective] crisis can precipitate a sense of the 
present that disconnects the future from the past by putting such a future beyond the grasp of 
historical sensibility.”284 (See, for instance, Alan Weisman’s best-selling book The World 
Without Us (2007), which Chakrabarty singles out as exemplary of this tendency to abstract from 
both the past and present and to fantasize the impending future.) Against this tendency, 
Chakrabarty, a historian by training, asserts that “[t]he discipline of history exists on the 
assumption that our past, present, and future are connected by a certain continuity of human 
experience.”285 In Freedom in the Anthropocene, Melathopoulos and Stoner similarly assert the 
necessity of immanence to both the past (history) and the present, i.e., our contemporary 
juncture. Despite the fact that, “[t]oday, society threatens to transform planetary systems in a 
manner that surpasses the reach of geological processes of much larger timescales,” the co-
authors argue (paraphrasing Rosa Luxemburg) that the “prime political task at this stage in the 
Great Acceleration is being able to learn again, by learning the lessons of relating theory and 
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practice in history.”286 
 
VIII. “Death of Environmentalism”? 
14. Ingolfur Blühdorn’s concept of “post-ecologist politics” which attempts to articulate 
the contemporary post-‘90s narrative emplotment of environmental politics also expresses a 
desire to rethink and reconstitute eco-politics “since the late 1980s” via immanent critique.287 In 
so doing, Blühdorn’s work directly remarks upon the posthistory of eco-politics, which for him is 
marked by the exhaustion of an “ecologist critique of modernity and the ecologist belief in a 
comprehensively different society,” both of which have stymied eco-politics’ capacity for 
society-shaping praxis.288  
Shellenberger and Nordhaus’ Death of Environmentalism (2004) similarly points to such 
an exhaustion with their sweeping call to “reexamine everything we think we know about global 
warming and environmental politics.”289 Interrogating the outcome of such politics, the co-
authors ominously query: “has the U.S. environmental community’s work over the past 30 years 
laid the groundwork for the economic, cultural and political shifts that we know will be 
necessary to deal with the crisis?”290 However, in the specific case of the authors of Death of 
Environmentalism their emphasis is still on solutions, albeit revamped ones (see their Break 
Through (2007)), that look to the state and “increasingly sophisticated technical solutions to 
climate change” (see, for example, the controversial Solar-Radiation Management (SRM) 
technologies) to bring about an “ecological revolution.”291 In these appeals to the state and 
techno-scientific reason, we should note the attitude of passivity and the temporality of 
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expectancy that accompanies such recognitive gestures. These gestures index, more generally, 
the “inability of society to freely regulate itself” and transform itself in the direction and at the 
service of social freedom.292  
15. As many critical histories of environmentalism capture, such as the classic Forcing 
the Spring, the early period of environmental politics and movements in the ‘60s–70s in North 
America and Europe focused on a wide array of problems (many inherited from the anterior anti-
nuclear movement, among others), for instance, ranging from managing “the quality of air, water 
and soil” to “protecting flora and fauna.”293 However, in contemporary discourse surrounding 
environmentalism in our early 21st century moment, there is detectable a new sense of focus, 
temporal urgency and discursive intensification, given that global warming is now generally 
understood to pose “the greatest challenge” for eco-politics.294 This new ascribed primacy of 
climate change, however, has not canceled out the manifold of other ecological problems 
engendered by the society-environment problematic but has only intensified them, e.g., loss of 
biodiversity, resource scarcity, pollution, etc. 
16. Given recurrent reports and declarations of the death of environmentalism, it is 
tempting to read a ‘death drive’ out of the body of literature comprising critical histories of eco-
politics written, say, within the last 30 years beginning with Gottlieb’s seminal Forcing the 
Spring. These works seek to bring to cessation (via critique) and hence inaugurate an ‘end’ of 
their object; e.g., Shellenberger and Nordhaus: “modern environmentalism…must die so that 
something new can live.”295 These summary ends, we should note, operate on a more 
fundamental disagreement vis-à-vis the theory and praxis of hitherto eco-politics, and thereby 
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create a critical fissure in the normative regimes of sense and sense-making surrounding what is 
called environmental politics. 
Beyond such dissensus, critical histories of eco-politics often conclude with the upshot of 
inaugurating some new beginning. Yet this Arendtian-like arche tends to take on a confused and 
opaque form; often not being clearly articulated or only tentatively put forth, such as in the final 
chapter of Haq and Paul’s Environmentalism Since 1945: “The Future of Environmentalism.”296 
More common, however, is for these works to opt for hope, expectancy, futural projection and 
the like,297 rather than dialectically engaging and critiquing actually-existing environmental 
politics and the antinomies it expresses in theory and praxis. Nevertheless, in terms of their 
positive, manifest-content, these critical histories express what might be called an anarcho-realist 
maxim: they demand for a more real, more authentic, more socially-engaged, more democratic, 
(etc.) form of environmentalism to emerge in order to overcome its perceived inefficacy and/or 
history of failures. 
 
IX. Antinomies of Environmental Politics 
17. The afterlife of the environmental politics and movements that emerged alongside 
and out of the ‘60s-70s New Left in the global north298 has resulted in the antinomy (among 
others299) between, on the one hand, forms of eco-anarchism that are protest-driven and 
undertake other such forms of resistance; and, on the other hand, reformist iterations of so-called 
market environmentalism that engage with the state and within mainstream politics to mitigate 
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the ongoing environmental crisis.300 This antinomy can be conjured, for instance, via the 
disjunction—and the great dissonance that obtains therein—between the 2015 Paris Climate 
Conference and the 2016 protests currently being carried out by indigenous First Nations tribes 
surrounding the North Dakota pipeline. To be sure, both of these struggles and actions seem 
equally necessary, vital, and important, but take place, as it were, in different, non-
communicating realms of praxis and theory. As John Hannigan has noted, “environmental 
debates reflect the existence not just of an absence of certainty…but rather the existence of 
contradictory certainties.”301  
Taken individually or as an unlikely aggregate, these antithetical poles of eco-politics302 
appear unable to bring about the thoroughgoing social transformation that both assert is 
necessary in order to cope with, much less avert, ongoing and future climate change. Indeed, the 
so-called “ecological revolution” called for by reformist market-environmentalism is in many 
ways comparable to the thoroughgoing society-shaping demanded by contemporary eco-
anarchist discourse, albeit the latter is typically thought to be achieved via forms of direct action. 
Addressing this antinomy between “alternative groups” of eco-politics and “mainstream 
environmentalism,” Gottlieb will query in Forcing the Spring whether “mainstream and 
alternative groups [can] find a common language, a shared history, a common conceptual and 
organizational home?”303  
18. These irreconcilable extremes can here be placed within a broader history of the Left, 
                                                   
300 “The radical/mainstream division has characterized the contemporary environmental movement since its 
inception” (Melathopoulos & Stoner, FITA, 61). In her monograph on Adorno, The Melancholy Science, p. 98, 
Gillian Rose interrogates the genesis of antinomies, that is, how an antinomy surfaces in thought and can be 
regarded as cogent, valid, and objective. 
301 Hannigan, Environmental Sociology, 49 
302 They also tend to be ideologically hostile toward one another; for instance, as Gottlieb has noted, many eco-
anarchists “don’t like to call themselves environmentalists” (Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 401). 
303 Ibid., 319. 
  96 
and more specifically, in relation to the problematics that also beset the New Left304 (and here we 
echo one recent trend in academic leftist discourse305). Such antinomies can be addressed, 
however circuitously, through an immanent and historical metacritique of Theodor Adorno’s 
corpus, which both anticipates and directly engages theoretical and practical obstacles that not 
only predated the historical emergence of the New Left but were also countenanced by this 
protean iteration of the Left in real, historical time. Yet for this ostensibly more general history 
of the Left (encompassing, for our purposes here, eco-politics) to attain to its concept, it would 
need to open itself up to voices and traditions that, historically, have been authoritarianly muted 
or repressed by the institutional forms of the Left. These are voices that still exist at the margins 
of the dominant ‘left’ discourses and institutions as, quite literally, noise emitted from subaltern 
mouths.  
 
X. What Is Eco-anarchism? 
19. Eco-anarchism was first classically conceptualized by Murray Bookchin in the early 
‘60’s following his break with Trotskyism and Marxism more generally, an arc that resembles 
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that of Cornelius Castoriadis’ own break from Trotskyism/Marxism and subsequent embrace of 
council-communism. In the essay “Ecology and Revolutionary Thought” (1964), Bookchin 
introduced the concept of ecology into radical politics. Rooted in his critiques of hierarchical 
societies that are predicated on the domination of (wo)man by man, eco-anarchism operates on 
the basis of a horizontal democratic confederationalism or libertarian municipalism. Both of the 
latter are comparable to the council-communism in vogue during the ‘60s-70s New Left, a period 
of the Left that witnessed the further cleaving of (neo-)anarchism from Marxism: a turn 
motivated by discontents of anti-authoritarianism and anti-Stalinism.  
20. We should note here that contemporary eco-anarchism and neo-anarchism more 
generally, both of which are forms of praxis that construct a rhetoric out of resistance, have 
acquired a new aura and signification in the wake of the 1999 anti-globalization Seattle protests. 
This event inaugurated what some have defined as our post-political activist-driven culture, 
which has given birth to what Liza Featherstone, et al. have termed “activist-ism,” a term that 
explicitly echoes Adorno’s late concept of “actionism.”306 What is captured by these critical 
concepts is a form of subjectivity and social practice that, in expressing an extreme, runs the risk 
of failing to apprehend its own unthoughts and categorical theoretico-practical others. Such a 
critique of neo-anarchism is levelled by Moishe Postone, who has written of post-‘60s New Left 
“resistance” as “fail[ing] to grasp its own conditions of possibility”:  
[After the late-‘60s] [t]he idea of a fundamental transformation became bracketed and, 
instead, was replaced by the more ambiguous notion of resistance. The notion of 
resistance, however, says little about the nature of that which is being resisted or of the 
politics of the resistance involved…[Resistance] is rarely based on a reflexive analysis of 
possibilities for fundamental change that are both generated and suppressed by the 
dynamic heteronomous order. [Resistance] is an undialectical category that does not 
grasp its own conditions of possibility; that is, it fails to grasp the dynamic historical 
context of which it is a part.307 
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Postone’s gross but provocative critique of resistance here raises the question of what 
dialectical resistance might look like, i.e., resistance that does in fact grasp its own conditions of 
possibility. 
Yet anarchism and more generally, nonconceptuality, spontaneity, and praxis born of 
immediacy and contingency, tend to be blind spots (and thus phantasms) for ‘major’ discourses 
and epistemes, constituting not only the latter’s subaltern others but also perhaps their 
(repressed) conditions of possibility, much like the big toe or the gaping exposure of the human 
eye for Bataille. Consider, for instance, the historically fraught relationship between Marxism 
and anarchism, in which anarchism tends to constitute the former’s banished and repressed other. 
Classically, this tension crystallized in the infamous quarrel between Marx and Bakunin 
surrounding the First International of 1864 and was borne out in the broad dismissal of the figure 
of Blanqui in Marxian thought,308 whom Benjamin sought to recover in his Arcades Project. 
 
XI. Disagreement: Eco-Anarchism and Environmental Reformism 
21. The tension between anarchist and reformist/mainstream environmental politics, 
much like the disjunctions between academic/extra-academic, Marxism/anarchism, 
theory/praxis, etc.—many of which appear to have arisen or have roots in the ‘60s-70s, but 
whose prehistories no doubt run much deeper309—can be regarded, to paraphrase Adorno, as two 
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torn halves of an “integral freedom” which, however, do not add up to a whole.310 In other 
words, both sides are moments or ingredients of a dialectic that would place both terms into a 
mutually-constitutive dynamic. Put in the phraseology of Walter Benjamin’s “dialectics of 
intoxication”: it would take “the energies of intoxication”—“a praxis oscillating between fitness 
exercises and celebration in advance”—and the “constructive, dictatorial side of revolution” 
(“methodical and disciplinary preparation”) for the integral whole of theory and praxis to be put 
back together, such that, as Benjamin writes, “reality [has] transcended itself to the extent 
demanded by the Communist Manifesto.”311 For our purposes, perhaps as Benjamin suggests it is 
only through such a dialectics that combines the rational-processual (typified here by reformist 
market-environmentalism) with messianic immanence (seen in forms of eco-anarchism and 
resistance) that the dynamic exchange between theory and praxis could be reconstituted as a 
‘whole.’ Following Adorno and to a certain extent the pragmatism of Dewey, critical social 
theory must risk tendentially mediating the enduring and unresolved antinomies of social praxis 
(without, however, resolving such antinomies) in order to open up speculative possibilities for 
praxis’ own self-overcoming—a capacity for reflection praxis can hardly afford.  
 
XII. Idea as Constellation of Extremes 
22. In the Trauerspiel, Benjamin puts forth an understanding of the idea as a constellation 
of extremes. This thought-figure which suspends philosophical integrative mediation is 
methodologically taken up by Adorno who defines the “idea of truth” in Negative Dialectics as 
the “touch[ing]” of “two extremes.”312 While truth, or perhaps more crucially for Adorno, social 
truth, lies “in and through the extremes, in the extremes themselves,” “[t]he two [extremes] 
                                                   
310 Adorno & Benjamin, Complete Correspondence, 130. 
311 Benjamin, Selected Writings Vol. 2, 210, 218. 
312 Adorno, ND, 375. 
  100 
cannot,” however, “be glued together in a synthesis.”313 As Adorno relates in an off-hand manner 
in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics, “I was someone who tended to extremes, who detected 
something false in syncretism and who instinctively objected to happy mediums, following 
Arnold Schoenberg, who had written that the middle road is the only one that does not lead to 
Rome.”314 As we explored in chapters 1–3, the veritable resources for reconciling praxis and a 
possible reconciled life lie precisely in these extremes or antinomies for Adorno: “What has not 
been severed lives solely in the extremes.”315 Thus, “[t]he only thoughts to have a chance are 
those that go to extremes, capable of cerebral acrobatics.”316  
 
XIII. Method: Natural History  
 
the negativity of natural history—which always discovers what phenomena used to be, 
what they have become and, at the same time, what they might have been retains the 
possible life of phenomena as opposed to their actual existence.—Adorno317 
 
23. Through relating its prehistory to its posthistory, the natural history of environmental 
politics—more precisely, the natural history of the problem-idea of environmental politics—can 
be “virtually explored” and “assembled,” one which exposes a logic of decay and devolution.318 
Indeed the “allegorical vision” that opens up natural history, in which Benjamin immerses and 
absorbs himself in the Trauerspiel; the “vision” whose sidelong, melancholic gaze strips 
historical phenomena of cultural and ontotheological accretions, bestows upon them in the 
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latter’s stead a “natural life” (natürliches Leben) with their own singular natural history.319 This 
vision also opens up, for our purposes here, the space-time for Benjamin’s “thanatological model 
of interpretation,” whereby critique intensifies and assists in the natural-historical mortification 
of works, which illuminates the ‘truth content’ of a work through the burning up of its material 
content and results in the work’s collapse.320 Yet as Deleuze reminds us, “Problems-Ideas are 
positive multiplicities, full and differentiated positivities described by the process of complete 
and reciprocal determination which relates problems to their conditions.”321 Thus “[t]he 
positivity of problems”—whence springs affirmation, decision, etc.—“is constituted by the fact 
of being ‘posited.’”322  
Indeed, by bringing into constellation the remote extremes of its development (pre- and 
post-history)—as critical histories of eco-politics normatively do, that is, critiques that (however 
unconsciously) explore the conditions of im/possibility for the theoretico-practical 
transformation of such politics—‘environmental politics’ can be grasped and critiqued 
immanently in the direction of its potential self-comprehension. A natural history of 
environmental politics would thus occasion the problem-question of the appropriate self-
transformation (being for-itself) of such politics and thereby subsequently broach its in/capacity 
for social transformation (being in-itself). Natural history thus, while “virtual” in its 
philosophico-historical form of presentation, nevertheless opens up the space for working 
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through reified forms of (self-)appearance which, as necessary and psychically-real phantasms, 
bar the necessary (self-)recuperation that is the condition of possibility for self-determination and 
self-legislation on the models of the psyche and that of collective praxis.323 Yet a natural 
history—which Benjamin argues requires “protection in order to unfold clearly and 
[unperturbed] by human life”—amounts to little more than a critical historiographic poetics that 
crystallizes into a constellation the pre- and post-history of a phenomenon.324 Indeed, as 
Benjamin reveals, when such a history is constructed and finally attains “rest,” such 
“philosophical history” (which he defines as “the science of the origin”) becomes “natural-
historical” in a ‘vulgar,’ “inauthentic” sense: becoming is translated into being and thereby 
attains the presence of still-life.325 Philosophical history, the form of research and presentation 
this thesis undertakes, hence cannot take comfort in its own idea, and must remark upon its own 
ipseity in the face of its categorical antithesis, praxis. At the same time, however, such an anti-
historiographic poetics must also strive to reestablish the historically-liquidated “umbilical cord” 
between theory and praxis; in our case here: explore (minimal) conditions of im/possibility for 
their tentative rapprochement.326  
 
XIV. What Does Climate Change? 
24. Calls from environmentalists for “systemic changes,” the “transformation of society,” 
an “ecological revolution,” and so on, in order to avert or cope with ongoing and future climate 
change and its attendant ecological extirpations, have increasingly displaced its former privative 
language of protection (e.g., biodiversity), reduction (e.g., emissions), mitigation (e.g., 
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degradation), etc.327 These intensifying demands, however, appear at odds with the trajectory of 
the eco-politics and -movements issuing from the ‘60s and ‘70s in the global north, which have 
witnessed “wide-ranging institutionalization” and have resulted in the above reformism/ 
resistance antinomy, among others.328 Further, the transference and projection of leftist demands 
onto eco-politics—seen for instance in the critical reception of the high-profile environmentalist 
and writer Naomi Klein’s This Changes Everything (2014)329—have raised the stakes for 
environmental politics in general and, moreover, have retroactively rendered past and present 
forms of such politics apparently inadequate. Indeed, the critical reception and broad popularity 
of Klein’s book have served as indicators of both the increased awareness of the preponderance 
of anthropogenic global warming as well as the increasingly high demands made upon eco-
politics. Epithets such as ‘market environmentalism’ and ‘green capitalism’ call into question, by 
their very names, a specific and potentially limited political approach to reckoning with the 
environmental crisis that looks to the state and reformist measures to address this enduring 
problem. As Klein has succinctly put it, “there are no non-radical options left before us.”330 Thus 
eco-politics faces “the same theoretical problem that socialism [i.e., the traditional Left] 
confronted much earlier as to whether it is a revolutionary or reformist ideology.”331 We should 
note here, however, that the topical antinomy we have thematized heretofore does not obtain 
between reform or revolution but rather between reformism or resistance, despite the fact that 
eco-anarchism and market environmentalism both acknowledge the necessity of some radical 
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othering of society.  
25. With This Changes Everything, Naomi Klein has emerged as a central figure in 
contemporary discourse surrounding environmental politics: one who is not reducible to our two 
above typologies of environmentalism and who has, moreover, sought to move beyond this 
either/or altogether. On the registers of her thought and temperament, we should note how Klein 
exhibits a certain compatibility between these two theoretico-practical orientations. Indeed, in 
terms of her reception, Klein has been celebrated by both neo-anarchists (see her No Logo 
(1999)) and also more mainstream, left-identifying liberals. This Changes Everything documents 
Klein’s own break with market environmentalism as an approach to addressing global warming 
and finds her rethinking how to best approach the problem. Seeing capitalist society as the 
fundamental stumbling block to tackling climate change (the subtitle of her book: “Capitalism 
vs. The Climate”), Klein has argued that nothing less than a “profound and radical economic 
transformation” will be able to avert the onset crisis.332 Yet Klein is wary of both local, “activist” 
approaches to bringing about such a transformation (that are “performed by a small tribe within a 
culture”) as well as reformist approaches that look to the “political class” (i.e., the managerial 
political elite), whom she criticizes as “wholly incapable of seizing those tools and implementing 
those plans [to redress the crisis], since doing so involves unlearning the core tenets of the 
stifling free-market ideology that governed every stage of their rise to power.”333  
Klein’s historico-political horizon, however, is ultimately that of the ‘60s-70s New Left 
and its irreducible concept of a ‘movement’ onto which her optimism and hopes for the future 
are inextricably cathected. In the final chapter of This Changes Everything she turns to the 
history of social movements and notes how in the civil rights movement, for instance, “the usual 
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categories dividing ‘activists’ and ‘regular people’” “became meaningless because the project of 
changing society was so deeply woven into the project of life. Activists were, quite simply, 
everyone.”334 While Klein sees such inclusivity as desirable, she insists that she is not calling for 
a “new movement that will magically succeed where others failed.”335 Instead, she seeks to 
understand how, like certain past social movements, “climate change can be the force—the grand 
push—that will bring together all of [the] still living movements.”336  
26. As has been argued by Richard Rubin (2009), the concept of a movement stands as 
something of a regulative idea for “the dominant conception of politics on the [post-New Left] 
Left.”337 Indeed, this normative understanding of a movement, which is wedded to the politics of 
the New Left, grasps its “goal,” Rubin writes, as putting “pressure on the government to do 
something or to not do something,” which—while not a bad or wrong-headed pursuit in and of 
itself—tends to bracket “the possibility that the global environment in which movements operate 
could itself ever be radically changed.”338 To be sure, Rubin continues, “[w]e will have 
movements against bad things, such as war, poverty, [etc.], but we are going to keep fighting 
essentially the same struggles under different conditions, sometimes better and sometimes 
worse.”339 What should be underlined here is that the horizon of a movement—Rubin goes on—
is a “profoundly pessimistic conception for the Left to have, and it is not the one it always had. 
At one time the Left had a much more triumphal conception of its own capacity to build a 
radically new world.”340 In other words, “a conception of politics centered on movements [or 
even, for that matter, a ‘movement of movements’ pace Klein] is one that has already taken a 
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huge amount of defeat and pessimism for granted.”341 Rubin here articulates one unthought of 
post-New Left politics, within which our contemporary post-political moment is contained. 
 
XV. Conclusion: Environmental Politics and the History of the Left, a Preliminary Re-
encounter 
 
27. Many of the theoretical and practical impasses environmental politics faces appear to 
predate its own historical emergence when placed into a more general economy of history, one 
which reaches farther back than the ever-lingering narrative emplotment of the ‘60s-70s New 
Left. More precisely, these problems can be understood as reiterations of ‘past’ problems in 
theory and praxis which various forms of the Left once countenanced in real, historical time but 
perhaps never properly worked through; problems that may consequently still persist, 
undigested, in the present. Yet while the theoretical and practical challenges faced by eco-
politics may have precedents in the history of the Left, or may be bound up with past leftist 
problems yet to be liquidated, the former are nevertheless unprecedented and must be addressed 
in their novelty and singularity given our historical juncture. In light of the above discontents 
with eco-politics, the appeal of grafting eco-politics and -movements onto a more general (but 
perhaps more dogmatic and authoritarian) history of the Left is that the perceived inefficacies 
and failures of eco-politics are accounted for and explained away by means of the reassertion of 
a historical master-narrative of the Left; and typically a homogenizing narrative that casts the 
Left with an inborn openness to degenerate. 
28. Such a tack is taken in a recent work of great ambition and massive scope, which we 
have cited extensively heretofore, Freedom in the Anthropocene: 20th Century Helplessness in 
the Face of Climate Change. In this work the trajectory and problematics of environmental 
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politics are indeed grafted onto a broader and encompassing history of the Left. Co-authors 
Melathopoulos and Stoner argue that working through the failed world-revolutionary politics of 
the Left in the early twentieth century (to be precise, from 1914–1923, ending with the “decisive 
defeat of communist uprisings in Germany, Italy, and Hungary”342) can help us come to grips 
with why contemporary eco-politics seems unable to effectuate satisfactory social transformation 
in the present. More broadly, these failures of the Left are also understood by the authors as 
setting the geopolitical stage for the unchecked post-WWII dynamic of the Great Acceleration.343  
The chief merit of Freedom in the Anthropocene lies in its heeding Chakrabarty’s call to 
explain  
this catastrophe [the Anthropocene]…[via] a conversation between disciplines and 
between recorded and deep histories of human beings in the same way that the 
agricultural revolution of ten thousand years ago could not be explained except through a 
convergence of three disciplines: geology, archaeology, and history.344 
 
In other words, heeding the call for radical interdisciplinarity in the face of the hyper-
object of global warming. Yet even further, Freedom in the Anthropocene queries the politics of 
the Anthropocene by integrating the political and tendential purview of Marxism with geological 
“deep histories” of the trajectory that the Anthropocene retroactively indexes.345 Despite our 
present ability to construct deep histories, Chakrabarty reminds us that “[i]n no discussion of 
freedom in the period since the Enlightenment was there ever any awareness of the geological 
agency that human beings were acquiring at the same time as and through processes closely 
linked to their acquisition of freedom.”346 To be sure, without the insertion of the immanent 
streams of agonistic politics and the modern pursuit of freedom, the Anthropocene stands as a 
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mere historical category. Describing past history that we do not identify with, geological space-
time and the trajectory of human history—wherein the modern pursuit of freedom arises—stand 
unmediated. Ultimately, Freedom in the Anthropocene succeeds in constellating two histories: 
the history of emancipatory politics as culminating in Marxism as a politics, and the deep 
geologico-ecological history of the Anthropocene. However, Freedom in the Anthropocene has 
by and large neglected examining the antinomies animating environmental politics as non-
identical from those bequeathed by the history of the Left, a task we have undertaken here.  
29. The twin pitfalls with regard to constellating the history of the Left and 
environmental politics are, on the one hand, to reduce one history to the other (i.e., one trajectory 
becomes a master-narrative); and, on the other hand, to treat them as distinct trajectories that 
exist in parallel universes (that have no bearing on one another). Heuristically, eco-politics is 
here presented as non-identical to the history of the Left so as to retain both of their respective 
trajectories and messianisms; yet, as I have advanced heretofore, it may be productive to regard 
this former historical trajectory as being entangled with the latter trajectory, if we are to 
adequately reckon with the former’s discontents. The reification of these two historical 
trajectories as categorically distinct thus opens up the possibility to virtually rearrange them into 
a new constellation via the critical model of allegory. Moreover, the purpose of speculatively 
mediating the two is to reveal how an apparently one-sided standpoint may have purchase 
beyond its own ipseity.  
30. Not only does Freedom in the Anthropocene posit a certain authoritative and self-
identical understanding of the history of the Left, but the co-authors’ tendencies to regard this 
specific trajectory as if it were the hidden truth of history347 risks succumbing to age-old 
hermeneutical trappings of leftist dogmatism. Like the religious spirit that sees God in 
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everything, such a left-centric view of history—that addresses each emergent phenomenon as 
being overdetermined by the past348—risks becoming a non-negotiable stance that closes off 
availability to both the present and future (and perhaps a different past) by fixating the ‘failed’ 
past, despite its avowedly good-cum-revolutionary intentions. (Trotsky and Trotskyism’s 
cathexis of 1917 would be a prime example of such an intransigent left-hermeneutics.) Such a 
model of interpretation resembles Freudian psychoanalysis insofar as every moment of crisis 
spells reemergence: each new crisis represents the ongoing failure to solve a past (psychic, 
social, etc.) conflict that was never adequately attended to and/or resolved. (This particular 
understanding of sedimented crisis is articulated in Adorno’s formulation, “the new…remains 
the old in distress, in its hour of need.”349) Worse, it can border on becoming a jargon of 
authenticity that belittles forgetfulness and authoritarianly declares an originary arche to which 
all thinking and praxis must claim fidelity.  
The above leftist hermeneutical trappings lie less in the Zizekian-Badiouian variety of 
Stalinophilic decisionism and more in an overidentification with Adorno’s cul-de-sac. In 
embracing Adorno’s ambivalences and antinomies, Freedom in the Anthropocene ultimately 
hypostatizes the historico-philosophical significance of Adorno and remains within the trap of 
compulsive historical retrieval, castigating all political forms born of immediacy and resistance 
as ‘New Leftism’ or undialectical anarchism. In other words, while Freedom in the 
Anthropocene effectively broaches the matter of Adorno’s historico-philosophical significance 
and explores the enduring antinomies that his corpus registers, the work is unable, 
notwithstanding, to overcome Adorno’s cul-de-sac, which is doubtless another matter altogether. 
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To be sure, overcoming Adorno’s cul-de-sac would first necessitate an acknowledgment of the 
ways in which our historical juncture is discontinuous with Adorno’s and, secondly, an 
acknowledgement that a minimum amount of experimentation, that is, present and futural 
(psychic) availability, is required in order to simultaneously move beyond this dead-end and all 
the while preserve the insights of Adorno. As we have sought to explicate in this chapter, such 
experimentation could come through thematizing the contemporary antinomies of environmental 
politics; or, perhaps in a different register, by addressing the antinomic ambivalences that are 
expressed in and through contemporary ecological subjectivity.  
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